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ACRONYMS & ABBREVIATIONS 
B-BBEE Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
BCEA Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
BEE Black Economic Empowerment 
SLF Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation 
StatsSA Statistics South Africa 
GLOSSARY
Business fronting A deliberate or attempted circumvention of the B-BBEE Act. 
Churning 
The movement of microenterprises in, and out of, business over 
time.  
Container 
An enclosed, rectangular-shaped, metal structure for storing cargo 
on ships, adapted for use as business premises for a range of 
microenterprises, including spaza shops. 
Economic survivalist 
In this context, an economic survivalist microenterprise would 
generate enough income to sustain the owner, but not enough to 
facilitate processes of business growth beyond the minimum, which 
would include undertaking bulk buying, investing in business 
premises or the medium- to long-term saving of income. 
Essentialism 
An account of social identity that sees it not as socially constructed 
but as reflecting innate differences, e.g. between races or ethnic 
groups. 
Food security 
Physical, social and economic access by individuals and households 
to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life. 
House shop 
A small-scale retail grocery outlet with a limited product range 
operating from within residential premises (see also spaza shop). 
Informal economy 
Those business environments in which informal enterprises and 
individual operators predominate, both spatially (geographically) 
and within the value chain of the production and distribution of 
goods or services. It comprises economic activities that are 
unregulated and unrecorded for taxation purposes. It includes both 
enterprises (including self-employment) and undocumented 
employees. Informal economic activities can include licit and illicit 
products and services. 
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Informal enterprise 
Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) considers informal enterprises to be 
“[t]hose businesses that are not registered in any way. They are 
generally small in nature, and are seldom run from business 
premises. Instead, they are generally run from homes, street 
pavements and other informal arrangements”. 
Informal sector 
The term is used to refer to marginalised, informal enterprises, 
operating within the informal economy.  For ‘informal economy’ see 
above. 
Informalist 
A business operator who capitalises on the terms and nature of 
informality in order to gain competitive advantage over formal 
and/or informal business rivals in a strategy to maximise financial 
profits. 
Microenterprise 
In the National Small Business Act (1996 and 2003 amendment), a 
microenterprise in the wholesale trade sector and catering and 
accommodation sector has fewer than five full-time employees, a 
turnover below R0.2 million and total gross assets valued at less 
than R0.1 million. 
Peri-urban 
A location adjoining an urban area; between the suburbs and the 
countryside. 
‘Race to the bottom’ 
A competitive state where (in reference to this study) a company 
attempts to undercut the competition’s prices by sacrificing quality 
standards or worker safety, defying regulations, or paying low 
wages. 
Reciprocal exchange 
In cultural anthropology, this refers to the non-market exchange of 
goods or labour ranging from direct barter (immediate exchange) to 
forms of gift exchange where a return is eventually expected 
(delayed exchange). 
Regulatory avoidance 
Workplace and employer practices to avoid workplace laws and 
other statutory obligations, which undermine the coverage and 
effectiveness of regulations established to maintain minimum labour 
standards. 
Regulatory exclusion 
Where a microenterprise is unable to meet the necessary criteria for 
falling within the regulatory fold. Involuntary exclusion comes 
about when the business breaks the law through its very existence – 
e.g. in a township or operating without certain licences or permits,
and that it cannot ever fall within the ambit of the law, or that doing
so will require considerable bureaucratic, legal or financial efforts.
Rural 
The countryside, especially areas of predominant agricultural 
production. 
Shack 
A small, crudely built cabin; colloquially known as a ‘shanty’ or 
‘bungalow’. 
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Shopkeeper 
This is the individual who owns and runs the spaza shop. Commonly 
shop employees are incorrectly referred to as shopkeepers. 
Employees are, however, shop assistants. 
Spaza shop 
A general retailer of household goods within a township context. For 
the purposes of this study, a spaza shop enterprise has the following 
features: 
• situated in a stand-alone and dedicated structure/space (not
operating from a room primarily used as private residence);
• has a sign advertising the business;
• has at least one glass-door (commercial) fridge;
• is open to retail customers for five days per week or more; and
• sells at least six of the following eight grocery items: maize meal,
rice, bread, milk, sugar, cool drinks, cigarettes, and/or cooking oil.
Survivalist 
In this study, a survivalist business refers to a microenterprise, run 
by a sole proprietor who provides a minimum livelihood for the 
entrepreneur but generates insufficient income to allow for 
investment into the business.   
Township 
In South Africa, a term for racially designated urban areas, usually 
located far from commercial or business centres, which were set 
aside during the apartheid period for black population groups. More 
recently, the term has become synonymous with housing 
developments and planned settlements for poor black South Africans 
and includes recently established low-cost housing settlements. 
Tuckshop 
A common name for a retail grocery outlet in the township setting. 
In this study we have interviewed enterprises of this nature and 
classified them in either ‘house shop’ or ‘spaza shop’ categories as 
per their best category fit. 
Wholesaler 
A business that sells to retailers who in turn on-sell to consumers. 
These enterprises can be formal or informal businesses. The 
category includes independent operators as well as corporate and 
multinational businesses. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
About 54% of South Africa’s township microenterprises trade in food or drink. More 
than two-thirds of these are grocery retail businesses in the form of spaza shops and 
smaller ‘house shops’. These are the predominant businesses within the ‘township 
economy’ and play an important role in food security, self-employment and community 
cohesion. In the last decade, the business of spaza shops (dedicated, signposted 
businesses with a range of foodstuffs and open five days per week or more) has 
undergone extensive change towards a new class of entrepreneurial traders – mostly 
foreign nationals. This change has meant that the sector has become increasingly 
controversial and associated with chauvinistic and xenophobic discourses targeting 
immigrants. While the nature, causes and extent of change in informal grocery retail 
markets have been noted by various authors over the past decade, there is as yet no 
comprehensive account of the changing nature of business dynamics and 
competitiveness in the sector.  
Methods 
Building on previous work, and to further explore the nature of changes in the sector, 
from January to October 2017 the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation NPC (SLF) 
conducted a qualitative research programme in nine urban, peri-urban and rural 
township settlements across all provinces of South Africa. The research included a 
business census that located, mapped and interviewed over 1 100 township-based 
informal retail grocery outlets in order to draw a comprehensive picture of business and 
competitive dynamics in informal retail grocery markets. Simultaneously, the 
researchers also purchased a range of products such as cigarettes and grocery items from 
each of these outlets, and conducted extensive discussions with relevant stakeholders 
in supply chains, local communities and the retail grocery sector in general. 
Results
Across the research sites the researchers noted demographic trends of change in the 
sector. First, overall spaza shop numbers are declining in what appears to be market 
contraction. Secondly, the share of foreign ownership is increasing, with South African 
microenterprises bearing the brunt of business decline. About 72% of all spaza shops in 
our sample are now owned by foreign (primarily Ethiopian, Bangladeshi and Somali) 
nationals. While we cannot claim that our sample is statistically representative, 
we believe it is broadly indicative of changes happening across the sector. 
What is behind these changes?  At first glance, the findings show that on many levels – 
product range, operational hours and in some cases pricing – these new spaza shops offer 
a superior customer experience to South African-owned shops. 
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However, a simplistic notion that the changes are simply owing to 
entrepreneurial foreign nationals outcompeting undynamic South Africans is 
misleading: in fact, there is a risk that these binary narratives fuel conflict and 
xenophobic violence. What we learned is far more nuanced. First, the dynamics of 
change in the informal sector are not solely driven by competition between spaza 
outlets, but also by supermarket and shopping mall encroachment, which has 
precipitated a ‘race to the bottom’ in the township retail grocery sector. Secondly, for 
both foreign-owned and South African businesses, the competitive edge that allows 
them to survive in this context is increasingly not simply entrepreneurial excellence but 
a significant process of value chain re-organisation, coupled with the adoption of 
strategies to avoid regulation.  
The South African spaza sector is increasingly being characterised by 
differentiation between two kinds of businesses: on the one hand, traditional 
‘survivalist’ operators, who are typically poor and South African, and who operate 
informally because of structural constraints; and on the other hand an emerging 
category of ‘informalist’ enterprises (comprising both foreign nationals and South 
Africans) that are significantly larger and more resilient, but which have embraced 
informality as a business strategy. These ‘informalist’ enterprises constitute a new 
and important phenomenon in the South African township economy, partly owing 
to distinctive business strategies that set them apart from the traditional spaza sector. 
These business strategies concern the nature of supply chain integration, the terms of 
employment and the reliance on contraband and counterfeit goods. 
Supply chain integration and ownership of multiple retail outlets 
Instead of ‘traditional’ independent owner-operated spaza shops, the sector 
is increasingly being characterised by outlets tightly linked to wholesalers through 
their supply lines. The researchers found wholesalers of this nature based adjacent to 
all the township research sites in the sample. These wholesale operators (often 
referred to as the spaza owner or ‘boss’) commonly serve as sponsors, employers or 
business partners of the ‘shop assistants’ responsible for running downstream 
spaza outlets. Supply agreements between spaza shops and wholesale outlets allow for 
enhanced economies of scale in stock procurement and aggregation of orders to 
spaza shops through which groceries are sold, but they also ‘lock in’ the spaza shops to 
their upstream sponsors. The implications of this value-chain arrangement are that 
many ‘informalist’ spaza shops should be seen as the retail ‘front end’ of a larger, 
vertically integrated informal grocery business entity, rather than (as is common in 
the South African and survivalist case) a stand-alone informal business activity.  
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Employment 
Informalist spaza shops are staffed by employee shop assistants (in our sample at least 
45% of respondents were employees). Nearly a third of all spaza shops have two 
employees or more, making them quite different from survivalist enterprises that 
typically rely on an owner-operator, supported by household labour. Workplace 
conditions are generally extremely poor. While our research could not ascertain complete 
details across all the South African study sites, in urban township sites of eThekwini, Cape 
Town and the rural Eastern Cape, shop assistants routinely reported that they lived inside 
the shop, often working 15+ hours per day for a seven-days-a-week service. Salaries 
varied, but in many cases (such as in eThekwini) wages were R400 to R800 per month 
plus food while working under these conditions. In Cape Town wages were higher 
(between R1 500 and R3 000). Migrants are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. 
Building on anecdotal learning throughout the study, a subsequent small investigation of 
Ethiopian shop assistants in Cape Town revealed that portions of wages are commonly 
retained by the employer for travel and other debts (61% of the subsample). Similarly, 
over 90% of spaza employees in this group have their passports retained by employers 
and do not receive written employment contracts. While different and varied 
employment models exist (such as working towards outlet shareholding), these 
employment scenarios clearly violate South Africa’s Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(BCEA).  
Contraband and counterfeit goods 
The South African media occasionally reports allegations that contraband and counterfeit 
goods are being sold in the informal sector. This research revealed an abundance of illegal 
cigarettes and counterfeit groceries, sold by both South African and foreign operators. Of 
the 577 retail spaza outlets where loose cigarettes were purchased, about 52% of the 
cigarettes were untaxed (determined on the basis of the retail price) and therefore 
contraband. Of the 177 spaza outlets with two employees or more (considered to be 
informalist in nature) that volunteered cigarette retailing data (including 21 South African 
shops), 138 outlets (78%) retailed contraband cigarettes. A variety of independently 
verified counterfeit grocery items was identified in 90% of the informalist outlets visited, 
in some cases representing up to 30% of set items purchased at an outlet. This included 
a variety of consumer products such as spices, matches, cigarette papers, sanitary pads, 
tea and razor blades. Contraband and counterfeit goods of this nature are sourced 
through supply chains that link to national and transnational criminal networks. These 
features and links are important characteristics of informalist businesses. The 
researchers were unable to find any evidence of ‘fake foods’ as recently reported in the 
media. 
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Discussion
Informality in South Africa reflects both the apartheid past and the future for the 
economically marginalised. Yet, unlike economic survivalism, which involves involuntary 
regulatory exclusion, the nature of informalist entrepreneurship in the spaza sector often 
also represents a strategy of embracing informality. While it offers significant trading 
advantages, the implications for inclusive growth are negative: it sustains a segmented 
labour market, leaves workers unprotected, reduces state revenue through taxation, 
weakens the influence of the state to minimise any negative impacts of these enterprises 
(such as societal impacts arising from contraband and counterfeit goods) and affects the 
ability of government programmes to shape macroeconomic development.  
Public debate about the changing dynamics in the South African township grocery sector 
have tended to be couched in a misleading dichotomy between ‘pro- versus anti-
immigration’ stances. This provides a poor framework for understanding the emerging 
business dynamics of a sector that, instead of competing within the regulatory framework 
now relies on competitive strategies that circumvent that framework; including trading 
in ways that subvert the law and squeeze survivalist businesses out of the market. This 
has, at times, resulted in violent and xenophobic responses. Further driving the 
informalist strategy is the emergence of shopping malls and supermarkets in the 
townships that use their considerable muscle to leverage the state for land access, zoning 
and licensing. The long-term effect, however, is to start a ‘race to the bottom’ in the 
grocery sector.  
Survivalist spaza outlets are sandwiched between these market participants and 
constrained by their enforced informality. Their reliance on alternative competitive 
strategies (such as kinship and loyalty arrangements) has meant they have collectively 
lost out in this race, being largely unable to compete within the changing competitive 
environment. A further important group of victims of this rapidly changing dynamic, 
often missed in the binary lens of xenophobic discourse, is the vulnerable newly arrived 
foreign-national shop assistant employees themselves, residing and operating in isolated 
outlets, some of them in highly exploitative working arrangements.  
‘Informalist’ strategies for spaza competitiveness capitalise on the legal space of 
informality accorded to survivalist enterprises (such as municipal concessions to operate 
home-based businesses in townships) and also bypass other important forms of 
regulation (such as labour laws and trading in legal products) in pursuit of profits. The 
implications are complex. While a wider range of grocery items are now available to 
township residents at reasonable cost, the unintended consequence of this transition (in 
the absence of the enforcement of state regulations) is market concentration via new, and 
potentially deeper, terms of informality and illegality.  
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Where does this lead? One precedent of this economic dynamic already exists: South 
Africa’s minibus-taxi sector gives a sense of what the future could look like in an industry 
built on systematic regulatory avoidance. Over the course of the last few decades, the 
minibus-taxi sector has become an almost impenetrable, politically powerful and 
concentrated network that operates vast local and regional transport services across 
South Africa. This network is largely beyond the control of state authorities, picking and 
choosing the elements of formality that suit its operations, and generally ignoring those 
that do not. Its drivers serve at the coalface of the business, earning the least money and 
carrying the majority of the personal risk. The situation for spaza shop employees in the 
face of embraced informality, crime and an atmosphere of xenophobia (which is in part 
fostered by these changing market conditions) is not dissimilar.  
What is to be done?
The fact that debates about informal township businesses are dominated by the concern 
with foreign incursion has had an unhelpful effect on discussions about regulatory 
intervention, often framing the matter as if the choice is between ‘protectionist’ 
regulations protecting South Africans, or deregulation and tolerance of immigrant 
entrepreneurs. This approach underestimates the seriousness of the situation, misses its 
connection to the restructuring of South Africa’s retail sector and the growing dominance 
of supermarkets, and misrepresents the nature of the regulatory choices that need to be 
made. The sheer number and spatial distribution of informalist retailers, the 
encroachment of supermarkets and malls, and South Africa’s overarching poorly 
performing macroeconomic environment suggest the probable demise of survivalist 
spaza shops.  
The present situation reflects this culmination of state failures. The South African 
government has failed to limit informalist regulatory avoidance throughout the value 
chain while simultaneously succumbing to the corporate power of shopping mall 
developers and supermarkets. Increasing numbers of politicians have come to simplify 
the development challenge, stoking xenophobic tensions by scapegoating foreign-
national spaza shop workers. Many of these workers number among the most vulnerable 
and exploited, operating at the coalface of xenophobia and violence. Note that many South 
Africans currently profit from this state of affairs – from the 36% of South African spaza 
outlets that we estimate sell contraband cigarettes (and their local manufacturers), 
through to South Africa’s corporates that supply spazas and sponsor their branding.  
Active state engagement is required, but more with respect to how township grocery 
retailing is presently conducted than who now retails groceries. Suggested policy-maker 
interventions include the following:  
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First, state attention must begin at the apex of grocery markets, working to understand 
the power structures, networks and individuals that have come to dominate the sector. 
This includes not only owners and employers in informalist spazas but also any of the 
wholesalers, manufacturers and importers who capitalise on regulatory avoidance and 
have variously supported the evolution of the market conditions to their present state.  
Secondly, a regulatory approach to enhance fair competition and business practice is 
necessary. This should address the macroeconomic environment underpinning the ‘race 
to the bottom’ with genuine transformation of the shopping mall and supermarket 
environments in ways that support the principles of broad-based black economic 
empowerment (B-BBEE) and emerging microenterprises. It further requires 
reconsideration of current municipal approaches to land-use zoning that reinforce 
economic inequality in townships.  
Thirdly, a process to ‘normalise’ the informal retail grocery sector must bring it towards 
a path of formalisation. This is not a call for protectionism. There are existing state tools 
and mechanisms to rein in the socially and economically undesirable consequences of this 
unrestrained capitalism and the embracing of informality. A carefully considered 
approach towards an appropriate regulatory environment must occur in ways that do not 
drive informal economy grocery businesses into deeper states of informality – or out of 
business altogether. While driving compliance poses capacity challenges, the financial 
opportunity in recouping lost tax revenue from the illicit cigarette trade alone represents 
billions of Rands to the fiscus annually. 
Finally, the South African government must do more to recognise the informal economy 
(which collectively employs more people than any individual sector) and embrace the 
opportunity it represents. With township settlements being the epicentre of population 
growth, it is critical that these local economies are stimulated in ways that benefit all 
entrepreneurs, employees and consumers. 
Shop assistant in secured spaza outlet, Philippi, Cape Town 
2018. Photograph by J Patrick. 
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1. Introduction
Spaza shops play an important role in food security by retailing household groceries in South 
African townships. These townships are home to as many as 50% of South Africans. Spaza shops 
are widespread residential-based businesses in these settings, predominating among the 54% 
of township businesses that retail food and drink (Petersen and Charman, 2017). Historically, 
spaza shops have functioned as incubators for township entrepreneurship and have been an 
important and accessible business opportunity for numerous generations of South African 
families. Spaza retailers allowed consumers access to daily necessities in township residential 
settings where formal retailers and shopping malls had limited presence, and in areas with high 
formal unemployment. These small shops traded items easily acquired from wholesalers or 
distributors and regularly demanded by neighbours. These items include products such as bread, 
milk, grain staples, cooking oil, cold drinks, soap, cigarettes and alcohol. The majority of spaza 
shops are unregistered, cash-based informal businesses and do not adhere, in the strict sense, 
to municipal rules for conducting business in residential areas (Liedeman et al, 2013). 
Spaza shops are visible and iconic township enterprises deeply ingrained in the South African 
imagination. Research to date has focused on various aspects of this sector (Ibrahim, 2016; 
Ligthelm, 2005; Rogerson and Beavon, 1982; Van Scheers, 2010). While few studies of the spaza 
trade at national scale have been made, Nielsen Holdings Plc (2016) have suggested that there 
are about 134 000 ‘traditional trade’ outlets, worth R46 billion in trade per annum. As much as 
40% of all food in South Africa may be retailed through these outlets (Trade Intelligence, 2016). 
Growth in this sector has been stimulated, among other reasons, by post-apartheid economic 
expansion and the densification of township populations. Recent years have seen considerable 
change in the sector, evidenced by the emergence of new forms of grocery businesses and a 
growing class of immigrant entrepreneurs. Simultaneously, national supermarket chains have 
aggressively pursued a share in township consumer markets (Brown et al, 2018). The impact of 
the changes associated with the entry of migrants in particular has been widely reported in the 
media and academia (such as Charman and Piper, 2012; Crush and Ramachandran, 2015) 
stimulating a highly polarised debate on the merits or demerits of change for South African 
township business, consumers and society.  
In 2017, in order to broaden the state of knowledge and explore competitive dynamics in the 
sector, the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation NPC (SLF) conducted small-area censuses of nine 
township settlements representing over 450 000 people across South Africa. Over 1 100 
township-based informal grocery retailers were located and interviewed. This report begins with 
a brief background discussion on the nature of the South African informal economy, followed by 
an account of the research methodology used in this study. This is followed by a description of 
the profile of informal retail traders that emerged, a discussion of their demographic 
composition and an exploration of the ways in which traders have used informality as a 
competitive strategy. In the concluding section we discuss the implications of the findings as to 
the nature of competition in the retail grocery sector and make recommendations for regulatory 
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strategies that can support inclusive growth and avert or reduce xenophobic tensions and 
violence. 
2. Background
2.1 The informal economy 
South Africa’s cities are characterised by sprawling, poorly serviced residential townships with 
limited employment opportunities and high levels of poverty. These localities include formal and 
informal settlements originating from pre-1994 apartheid and segregation planning as 
dormitories for black citizens, legally established and perpetuated through the Group Areas Act 
41 of 1950 (Union of South Africa, 1950). Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, informal 
traders and hawkers in these townships were legally considered ‘beggars’. This persecution was 
exacerbated under apartheid-era segregation, where black township residents were ‘temporary 
sojourners’ in white South Africa. Despite efforts to actively discourage informal economic 
activity in these areas, considerable and varied trade emerged and persisted anyway.  
With the abolition of influx control in the 1980s, townships became host to rapidly growing 
residential populations and expanding economic activity. Apartheid policy was reformulated to 
provide a measure of accommodation for an urban black population, and the South African 
government of the time slowly started to recognise the existence of ‘microenterprise’ activities 
that formed part of the ‘informal economy’. The state broadly characterised this sector as 
consisting of ‘businesses that are not registered in any way … small in nature … operated from 
homes, street pavements and other informal arrangements’ (StatsSA, 2007). The National Small 
Business Act 102 of 1996 (DTI, 1996) and subsequent amendment (26 of 2003) classifies as 
‘microenterprises’ all business activities employing fewer than five people, having a turnover of 
less than R200 000 and assets of less than R100 000. The South African Revenue Service 
considers businesses as informal when the operators (employers, employees or own-account 
workers) are unregistered for income or value-added tax and where the employers do not deduct 
income tax from salaries/wages (StatsSA, 2013). While South Africa’s informal economy is a 
small contributor to the national gross domestic product, Ranchhod et al (2015) showed that in 
Cape Town informal microenterprises bring about important localised economic impacts and 
represent the city’s single largest employment option (in terms of numbers of people). 
Furthermore, although historically conceptualised as separate from the ‘first economy’, the 
township informal economy is characterised by strong forward and backward links to the formal 
sector (Devey et al, 2006; Rogan and Skinner, 2017; Valodia, 2006). 
Using StatsSA Quarterly Labour Force Survey data, Valodia et al (2005) and Wills (2009) 
determined that trade constituted half of all informal business and employment activities. Wills 
(2009) identifies the main occupations for informal self-employed persons as street vending 
(38.4% of total non-agricultural informal employment), craft and related trade workers 
(including construction workers, tailors, mechanics; 29.9%), service workers (including shebeen 
owners and spaza shopkeepers; 16.5%) and technical occupations (5.7%). Over the course of the 
last decade, the authors have undertaken mapping and analysis of these businesses in townships 
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Plate 1: A stand-alone, signposted township spaza shop in a Cape Town 
township, with researchers’ bicycles. 
across South Africa. This information has been visually mapped in a number of publications (see 
e.g. Charman and Petersen, 2015).
2.2 Food in the informal economy 
Food and drink are the mainstay of the informal township economy. Charman et al (2015), 
reporting on a census of over 10 000 microenterprises at eight sites, found that the townships 
hosted a well-established and fairly diverse local economy dominated by informal trade in liquor 
(taverns, shebeens and ad hoc liquor sales) and groceries (spaza and house shops). Building on 
that study, Petersen and Charman (2017) concluded that, when taking into account all related 
businesses such as agriculture, greengrocers, butcheries, restaurants and informal food service, 
54% of all township microenterprises were food- and drink-related. The food economy is a basis 
for microenterprise establishment (particularly for women with dependent children). Of all 
township food-related microenterprises, nearly 70% are grocery retailers in the form of spaza 
and house shops – making them the predominant business activity in the sector (Petersen and 
Charman, 2018). 
2.3 Spaza shops and house shops 
Spaza shops and smaller ‘house’ shops (see ‘Definitions’) are small retail grocery outlets or 
convenience stores. Data from StatsSA’s Labour Force Survey (2007) indicates that spaza shops 
account for 6.6% of self-employment and 9.2% of home-based self-employment (Wills, 2009).
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While both spaza and house shop outlets are retail grocers, they are distinguished by important 
differences in operations, scale and owner outlooks. Recognising these differences, Charman et 
al. (2012) and Liedeman (2013) determined enterprise definitions for these outlets. In practical 
terms, where a township retail grocery outlet traded from dedicated premises, had business 
name signboards, a commercial (glass-door) fridge, operated five days a week or more and 
traded six of eight staple products including bread, milk, maize meal, rice, eggs, sugar, soft 
drinks and cigarettes, it was considered a ‘spaza shop’. Conversely, ‘house shops’ comprised 
smaller retail outlets trading from residential households with limited ranges of items such as 
chips (crisps), sweets, paraffin and frozen food, generally on an ad hoc basis. House shops are 
largely economic survivalist in nature, whereas spaza shops (even if small) demonstrate 
characteristics associated with entrepreneurial growth.  
Box 1: House and spaza shops – definitions and the law (see Charman et al, 2017)1 
There are legal and general ambiguities in defining spaza shops, house shops and other 
forms of informal businesses. In general, municipalities consider house shops as those 
operating from a dwelling house / outbuilding on a residential property, which retail 
grocery items, including perishable foods. Where the land-use scheme requires 
municipal permission to operate a house shop, this is usually subject to the conditions 
that the primary use of the property should be residential and the business operator 
reside permanently on the property. Some land-use schemes specify maximum floor 
area thresholds to ensure that the area devoted to business activities does not materially 
reduce the residential area. The operation of house shops would be severely curtailed if 
municipal land-use management regulations were systematically applied. But 
enforcement is very uneven, not least owing to the absence of a national regulatory 
framework on house shops, and limited municipal capacity to enforce land-use 
infringements. 
Spaza shops are considered in legislation as similar to house shops, but can operate 
from within a residential property or structure and/or a container situated on public 
open land, within a road reserve or informal settlement. 
Each municipality has discretionary authority to permit or restrict business activities on 
a particular land unit, as per their zoning scheme and high-order Spatial Development 
Framework objectives. In the City of Cape Town Metro, for example, house shops are 
permitted as a use right on properties zoned SR2, subject to a number of conditions. In 
other residential zones, property owners require permission to operate a home-based 
enterprise, unless the goods sold are produced or assembled on the property. In the City 
of Johannesburg, house shops are a consent right and therefore can only be established 
with municipal approval. 
1 livelihoods.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Post-Apartheid_Spatial_Inequality.pdf. 
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Most municipalities permit home-based enterprises on condition that the business 
proprietor resides on the property. The intention is to prevent a situation where a house 
enterprise is operated by an absentee owner(s) (i.e. an entrepreneur who has placed 
his/her employees in the house business). Furthermore, most schemes require a 
separation of business and residential space through, for example, separate entrances. 
This is to reduce the risk of harm to individuals in the household as a result of the 
business operation, the operation of equipment and exposure to products. These 
concerns are justified, not least in the context of the situation in which a business 
operator (or his/her employee) resides within the home business floor space itself. 
Understanding the strategies and practices of spaza shop operators presents students of the 
South African urban economy with some important challenges. Much of the literature, 
particularly that emanating from a business-school environment, has tended to approach spaza 
shops as if they are classical firms. While a ‘firm analysis’ can clearly contribute much to the 
understanding of spaza enterprises, these analyses have often tended to misunderstand the 
social context and the nature of the economic rationality that determine small-scale spaza 
operations. First, as Neves and Du Toit (2012) have pointed out, it is important to understand 
that these enterprises are often deeply entangled in the domestic economy of the operating 
household, being characterised by complex and hard-to-measure ‘hidden transfers’ between the 
domestic and the enterprise economy. This manifests, for instance, in the reliance on free labour 
by a household member, or in ‘offtake’ from the enterprise stocks by those same members.  
Secondly, the operations of these enterprises are profoundly entangled with the underlying 
social networks of reciprocal exchange on which poor South Africans depend. This extreme 
reliance on ‘social capital’ both enables and constrains the strategies available to them. South 
African spaza operators, for instance, are able to exploit significant resources of ‘social solidarity’ 
via their access to social capital and social networks to remain trading in the oversubscribed 
context of township markets. At the same time, their reliance on these resources also limits their 
ability to rely on traditional forms of competitive behaviour (e.g. price competition or the refusal 
of credit to defaulting customers) (Neves and Du Toit, 2012). These aspects of South African 
spaza economic strategy means that spaza operators are poorly positioned to compete with 
entrants from outside the township economy – whether these are powerful supermarkets, or 
foreign nationals with social and economic networks of their own. 
2.4 The township food-retailing environment 
The literature reveals considerable demographic and competitive change in informal retail 
grocery markets since 1994. An important finding of informal microenterprise research from 
2010 to 2015 by Charman et al (2015) is the extent to which foreign nationals (including citizens 
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of Somalia, Ethiopia and Bangladesh) have come to dominate the sector, owning and operating 
up to 80% of spaza businesses in certain township sites. Similarly, Das Nair and Dube (2016) 
cite Minanawe Marketing (2015), which estimated that 70% of spaza shops were foreign-
operated. Where research has been done on these markets, it has focused on primarily three 
broad areas: 
1. general business characteristics (Charman et al, 2012; Liedeman, 2013; Rogerson and
Beavon, 1980, 1982);
2. the entrepreneurial characteristics (or deficiencies) of spaza operators (Crush et al,
2017; Gastrow and Amit, 2013; Ligthelm, 2004); and
3. the impact of external factors on these businesses, in particular competition from
supermarkets (Ligthelm, 2008).
With respect to business competitiveness, Charman et al (2012) in Delft South (Cape Town) 
identified that an emerging sector of entrepreneurial grocery retailers has taken advantage of 
local spatial opportunities. This involved strategically positioning retail shops within residential 
areas and in close proximity to existing spaza shops. In addition, Charman et al (2012) and 
Liedeman (2013) identified different business strategies explaining the rise and competitive edge 
of immigrant (primarily Somali) spaza retailers. These strategies include collective purchases, 
price discounting and accessing efficient distribution networks. These shops also had multiple 
owners and were largely employee-operated. Liedeman (2013) further showed that illegal and 
transnational labour-supply networks played a key role in securing shop workers. In recent 
years, the collective impact of strategies like these has resulted in considerable advantage, 
driving demographic change in the sector. In a panel study of Delft South, Charman and Petersen 
(2015) found that the proportion of South African-operated spaza shops had decreased from 
50% to 18% of all outlets between 2010 and 2015 (see Maps 1 and 2). Their research further 
identified significant churning in the spatial positioning and ownership of foreign-national 
shops: few remained operated by the same persons or remained in the same place (rather 
moving to nearby sites). 
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Map 1: Delft South with relative distribution of foreign- and South 
African-owned spaza shops, 2011 
Map 2: Delft South with relative distribution of foreign- and South 
African-owned spaza shops, 2015 
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The influx of foreign nationals is not the only significant change taking place in the township 
economy. Simultaneous to this transition, there has been considerable growth in the market 
share of South Africa’s corporate businesses in serving township populations. The rapidly 
growing South African township population represents a new frontier for corporate supermarket 
businesses and shopping mall developers. Authors such as Ligthelm (2005) posited that South 
African spaza shops were poorly positioned in the early 1990s for the emerging challenges of 
such competition. This was for myriad reasons, but importantly because many spaza businesses 
were operated by economic survivalists, and their enterprises were highly vulnerable to shocks 
(such as family crises). While supermarkets increase food procurement options for township 
households (accommodating 65% of township household food purchases in Philippi, according 
to Brown et al (2018) they pressurise spaza shops on price competitiveness. While supermarkets 
are not necessarily always cheaper, they are better positioned to take advantage of rising 
demands at month-end when township residents conduct bulk household shopping. Township 
shopping malls (with supermarkets as anchor tenants) have wrought significant business 
impacts with, for example, Ligthelm (2010) reporting that 38.3% of township businesses in the 
vicinity of Soweto’s Maponya Mall closed down within a year of the mall opening. 
2.5 Interpreting the decline in South African-operated 
spaza shops 
The changes in the township grocery retailing sector reflect a decline in South African spaza 
outlets and a range of new competitive and social dynamics. In much of the academic and popular 
literature, the interpretation of these changes and their significance is dominated by a focus on 
the implications of the inflow of foreign nationals with differing perspectives on the rights to 
trade and pursue livelihoods that should be afforded to the new generation of (foreign) spaza 
operators as opposed to South African shopkeepers. 
Perspectives favouring foreign-national spaza rights to trade
Advocates of the new generation of foreign-national shops highlight how the evolving informal 
retail grocery market has given rise to new forms of entrepreneurship, decreased consumer 
prices and enhanced customer service. In this respect, Gastrow and Amit (2013) and Ibrahim 
(2016) in their respective studies argue that the competitive practice of Somali traders was to 
provide better service to customers and offer broader product ranges and lower prices on goods 
than their South African counterparts. These ‘flexible selling practices’ included end-of-month 
sales, passing on wholesaler discounts, hampers comprising high-demand products, interest-free 
credit and extended trading hours. Similarly, Plastow (2015, pg 2) claims that foreign-national 
businesses provide shoppers with “what they want, reducing margins and selling more, whilst 
cutting … overheads to the bone”, and compares this with retail supermarket chains that have 
increasingly competed with informal grocery retailers in the last decade.  
WORKING PAPER #59 ǀ 24 
Gastrow and Amit (2013) and Ibrahim (2016) found Somali collective investment business 
models in terms of establishing business partnerships, multiple shop shareholdings, diversified 
business interests and pooled logistics. While some of these practices are not altogether 
innovative in general business practice, their emergence in the spaza sector has potentially 
resulted in cheaper groceries (albeit marginally, according to Charman et al, 2012) and 
reportedly other benefits to the township economy. For example, both Tawodzera et al (2015) 
and Gastrow and Amit (2013) claim that foreign-national spaza shops actively participate in job 
creation both directly (for predominantly South African women) and indirectly (acquiring their 
products from South African-owned businesses).  
Gastrow and Amit (2013) see the decline in the number of South Africans in the spaza sector as 
a consequence of South Africans’ resistance to changing their operating practices (such as not 
extending their operating hours and lacking business acumen), thus limiting their 
competitiveness. In this school of thought, the blame for the decline in South African-owned 
spaza shops is largely apportioned to insufficiently entrepreneurial South Africans themselves. 
These accounts do not acknowledge the broader structural constraints historically endured by 
South African spaza shop owners, their lack of finance and weak negotiating position with 
suppliers, and the social role of spaza shops in communities.  
Perspectives favouring South African shopkeeper livelihoods 
On the other side of the debate, a range of authors and bodies has argued that there is a need to 
moderate the change in dynamics in the spaza sector, highlighting the social costs of the current 
market-led trajectory.2 Charman et al (2012) argued that these demographic changes have had 
a disproportionate impact on South African women, the traditional spaza shop operators who 
bear the brunt of business closures. The same authors also considered that, while foreign-owned 
spaza shops may provide groceries to township residents at cheaper prices, the loss of South 
African businesses may erode the local social fabric. Changing ownership and retailing dynamics 
and churning in the sector weaken personal ties and the community fabric, as shops change 
hands and store employees are regularly rotated.  
In the absence of other interventions in the sector, various South African spaza shop owners’ 
associations have emerged, purportedly in the interests of their constituents. The South African 
Spaza and Tuckshop Association3 emerged in the late 1990s under the guidance of 
Johannesburg’s then-mayor, Isaac Mogase, alongside regional outlets such as Cape Town’s 
Khayelitsha-based Zanokhanyo Retailers’ Association. These bodies highlighted the nature of 
change in the spaza market and lobbied for protection against foreign encroachment. Some have 
taken practical steps to this end, in some cases advocating for the physical removal of foreign-
national shops from the townships. This ongoing social and economic dynamic has almost 
2 Later in this paper we introduce the term ‘informalist’ to describe the capitalist, entrepreneurial and informal 
businesses that characterise this market-led trajectory. 
3  https://www.sastaa.org.za/ 
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certainly contributed to the rise of xenophobic discourse and violence in township communities. 
Antagonism towards foreign nationals has been noticeable since about 2008, with regular media 
reports of sporadic attacks on spaza shops in particular. Charman and Piper (2012) indicate that 
violence may also be used as a competitive strategy to keep foreigners out of local markets, and 
between businesses (both South African and foreign) to preserve market share.  
The real-world implications of this transition are complex: while customers have welcomed the 
greater convenience and better prices from these new businesses, others have also articulated a 
sense of frustration and anti-foreigner sentiment, leading at times to violent conflict.4 The looting 
of foreign-national spaza shops and the associated loss of lives have rightly been condemned.5 
These negative sentiments have led Crush (2008, pg 7) to declare that “South Africans have let 
themselves down by tending and nurturing xenophobia”. Violent events of this nature have also 
tarnished South Africa’s international standing. 
Looking beyond identity
The direct link between positions on regulatory intervention with stances for or against the rights 
to trade of foreign migrants has contributed to an increasingly unhelpful polarisation of the 
debate on economic policy in the township economy. In these arguments, normative stances on 
the desirability of affording rights to trade are closely linked to deeply differing assessments of 
the reasons for demographic change and the factors underpinning the success of foreign traders. 
As a result, commentators have tended to frame the policy debate as a choice between 
‘deregulation’ (allowing more efficient traders to succeed) and ‘protectionism’ (shoring up 
possibly inefficient but socially desirable survivalist traders). 
However, blunt criticism of South Africans as xenophobes (or conversely blaming foreign 
nationals for ‘taking over’ the spaza sector) does not reflect the many nuances in this story. The 
changes in the retail grocery sector across the various research sites demonstrate a rapid and 
remarkable transition.6 As the field investigations unfolded, the researchers realised that the 
nature of these changes was not simply a consequence of the supposed lack of business acumen 
of (mostly South African) grocery survivalists. These changes were also caused by the changing 
structural position of spaza outlets in the value chains that supply the township economy and 
the changing entrepreneurial business strategies that have emerged to accompany this.   
In this paper, we argue for a different, less morally and ideologically overdetermined angle from 
which to assess the nature and implications of change in the township economy. Rather than 
seeking to explain socio-economic change via essentialist appeals to the entrepreneurial cultures 
of South African spaza owners and their foreign counterparts, we argue that competitive success 




6 mg.co.za/article/2015-01-29-spazas-its-not-just-the-economy-stupid  
WORKING PAPER #59 ǀ 26 
needs to be understood structurally, by paying attention to the changing nature of value-chain 
governance in the township economy, and considering the context of supermarket encroachment 
(Peyton et al, 2015). Competitive outcomes in the township economy are related, not simply to 
the entrepreneurial efficiency or inefficiency of particular spaza operators, but rather to their 
changing structural position in the township economy and their ability to make use of the 
opportunities (and avoid the downsides) of the local regulatory environment.  
2.6 Why was this study conducted? 
While the extent of change in informal grocery retail markets – in urban, peri-urban and rural 
environments – has been noted by various authors over the past decade, little comprehensive 
understanding has been gained on business dynamics within the sector across the geographic 
breadth of South Africa. With spaza shops being an important part of the fabric of township life 
and under new and different business pressures, changes in this sector may have unpredictable 
and significant economic and social impacts. Through conducting primary field research across 
a range of urban, peri-urban and rural research sites throughout South Africa, we aimed to draw 
a comprehensive picture of the nature of business and competition in informal retail grocery 
markets. Aggregating this data for analysis and then interpreting the findings through livelihoods 
and rights perspectives will illuminate the nature, scope and scale of changes in the sector and 
what this means for the spaza business, informal retail grocery markets, township businesses 
and consumers in general.  
3. Methodology
The research aimed to locate and interview owners and operators of retail spaza shops and 
smaller house shops trading in residential township settings in rural, peri-urban and urban 
townships in each of the nine provinces across South Africa. A cross-section of township localities 
included the following: 
• urban sites in Cape Town, Johannesburg and eThekwini;
• peri-urban areas in the North West, Northern Cape and Free State provinces;
• rural sites in the Limpopo and Eastern Cape provinces; and
• a cross-border locality in Mpumalanga to consider relevant international dynamics –
such as import-export trade, cultural or cross-border influences.
For four of these localities (Cape Town, Johannesburg, eThekwini and the Free State) prior small-
area census data on township spaza shops was available (respectively from 2011, 2012, 2013 and 
2015). This created a panel of comparative data. Building on that dataset, prior definitions for 
categorising spazas and house shops were retained (see Charman et al, 2012).  
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After refining the methodological approach in Cape Town, the team embarked upon the national 
programme of field investigation. Over the course of the research, data collection was undertaken 
by a team of experienced researchers, diverse in linguistic skills, racial profile and gender. The 
primary researchers (Leif Petersen, Nathi Tshabalala, Anthony Muteti, Camilla Thorogood, 
Phumzile Ntozana and Arthur Collier) travelled over 9 000 km by road to conduct field 
investigations in each locality. At each site local maps and bicycles were used to traverse the 
research areas on a street-by-street basis in a small-area census approach (Charman et al, 2015). 
The aim was to comprehensively locate and GPS-record all retail grocery outlets within a set 
defined geographic space (bounded by StatsSA enumeration areas) and conduct interviews with 
each outlet. Interviews consisted of both quantitative and qualitative inquiry, recording 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and exploring themes of business 
characteristics, pricing, supply chains and business challenges. Open-ended questions and 
opportunities for informal discussions were included to allow the researchers to inquire without 
unintended influence, and were iterative through allowing broader discussion to emerge. The 
questionnaire is included as Annexure I. 
Although appointments were not made beforehand, where possible the researchers sought to 
interview business owners. Through both discussion and the presentation of a brief introductory 
letter, the business representative was informed of the research objectives. Interviews were 
conducted upon securing consent. As the research took place during business hours, all 
businesses were open and trading. The majority of the identified research participants (99%) 
agreed to participate in the study. The interview took place in the shop premises and lasted 
approximately 30 minutes.
Table 1: Research sites for informal grocery market competitiveness study 
Province Location* / Designation Investigation dates (2017) 
Western Cape Cape Town – Urban** 16–27 January / 19–23 June / 16–18 November 
Northern Cape Peri-urban 22–26 March 
Free State Peri-urban 27–31 March 
Gauteng Johannesburg – Urban 1–5 April / 9–12 October 
North West Peri-urban 18–22 April 
Limpopo Rural 23–26 April 
Mpumalanga Rural – cross-border 27 April to 2 May 
KwaZulu-Natal eThekwini – Urban 22–27 May / 16–19 October 
Eastern Cape Rural 28 May to 4 June / 13–15 October 
*All sites have been de-identified for this paper
**Also served as a pilot site for testing the research inquiry and methodology
Furthermore, at each site the researchers visited and engaged with at least six upstream grocery 
wholesalers that had links to the spaza outlet operators. In all cases these wholesalers were found 
in the directly adjacent towns and suburbs. The wholesale outlets were visited and where 
possible, discussions took place with operators. These discussions focused on business links and 
operations upwards and downwards in the supply chain. Products were purchased at these 
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Map 3: South African township research sites for informal economy grocery 
 
outlets, in particular where products and specific brands had been noted in the spaza sector of 
the local township. Interviews and discussions helped the researchers to learn how the business 
models and supply chains work.  
This field approach meant that the research team was immersed in the township context for 
periods of four days to three weeks at a time. At least two local research assistants and 
community liaison persons were employed in each locality to ease the path of the researchers by 
explaining the nature of the inquiry, and to assist with translation and interpretation. On 
reinvestigating the Cape Town site before concluding the study, an Ethiopian field worker was 
employed to assist with interpretation and discussion. This was particularly important to assess 
new learning and contextualise insights from previous sites, ensuring the accuracy of 
assessments made. 
As the research progressed and the extensive presence of counterfeit goods was realised, we 
specifically investigated this matter in four provinces (the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Gauteng and the Eastern Cape). Purchases from a shopping list of 23 specific grocery items were 
made to review product availability, examine supply chain links, identify counterfeit products 
and scrutinise expiry dates. These items were scrutinised for authenticity by a range of 
individuals from the research team, corporate manufacturers and a private investigator fraud 
specialist. 
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The research process generated findings from 1 181 informal retail grocery outlets in township 
localities across all nine provinces. These localities predominately included spaza and house shops. 
A small number of other grocery-based business outlets – in particular table-based grocery 
retailers in Gauteng and Limpopo (see Table 2) – were also included owing to their prevalence in 
these sites. While all grocery retailers were mapped, interviews focused on spaza and house shops 
in order to present comparable analyses. This report specifically interrogates the findings 
pertaining to spaza shops. 
Table 2: Summary table of total informal retail grocery retailers located by type 
Province Total grocery 
retailers located at 
target site 
Spaza shops House shops Other* 
Western Cape 108 93 15 0 
Northern Cape 90 67 13 10 
Gauteng 329 120 82 127 
North West 110 67 25 18 
Mpumalanga 89 82 7 0 
Limpopo 122 80 10 32 
Free State 125 61 64 0 
KwaZulu-Natal 106 78 19 9 
Eastern Cape 102 70 13 19 
South Africa 1 181 718 248 215 
*The category ‘Other’ includes general dealers, fruit and vegetable traders and street hawkers selling grocery items.
They were located and/or interviewed in this study to create a context with reference to other predominant
business types.
3.1 Study limitations 
While this study uniquely considers informal retail grocery trading across South Africa, it is not 
statistically representative. Because the extent of these outlets in South Africa is unknown, it was 
impossible to develop a sampling frame that would guarantee statistically representative data. 
Any generalisations about the spaza sector as a whole should therefore be treated with caution. 
The findings of this study are broadly reflective of prior findings in the sector but also 
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demonstrate the impact of the broad knowledge gaps and the need for valid statistical studies, 
where possible. 
At least 45% of foreign-owned outlets were employee-operated. Some of these employees (in 
particular Somali and Ethiopian nationals) were not fluent in any South African language. In 
these cases, while it was possible to collect pricing and general data, it was not possible to obtain 
a deeper insight into business practices.  
Suspicion of outsiders – including researchers – was occasionally apparent. This was evident 
where inquiries had potential legal consequences, for example when researchers purchased 
loose, cheap cigarettes (an illegal retail practice) or enquired about labour conditions. This will 




Based on the 1 181 outlets surveyed and interviewed, the spaza sector was reconfirmed to be 
both geographically widespread throughout the visited townships and in the process of a 
large-scale transition from South African to foreign ownership. Furthermore, findings from the 
panel study (four provinces) show that overall the number of spaza outlets, and South African-
owned outlets in particular, appears to be in decline. 
4.1.1 High prevalence of residential grocery retail outlets 
The survey confirmed that township retail grocery businesses are densely distributed 
throughout residential areas and high streets in all the township sites (see Map 4 on the next 
page).  
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As reported in Charman and Piper (2012), spaza shop consumers prefer shopping at the 
‘cheapest, closest’ (walking distance) retailer. Their location in residential areas raises important 
policy challenges such as the implications for municipal land-use systems and for legitimisation, 
given that the majority potentially break municipal by-laws. 
4.1.2 Foreign-national dominance in the spaza market 
The findings confirm that increasing numbers of non-South Africans have entered informal retail 
grocery markets in recent years. About 72% of all spaza shops located in the collective study 
sample are now owned by non-South Africans. As can be seen in Table 3, Ethiopian, Bangladeshi 
and Somali nationals predominate. In three of the study areas, namely peri-urban Northern 
Cape, urban Cape Town, and Johannesburg sites, 89% of township grocery outlets surveyed 
were foreign-national owned. 
Map 4: Peri-urban area (North West Province) showing distribution of house shops and 
spaza shops in May 2017 
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Table 3: Spaza shop ownership by province and nationality 




Total % foreign 
owned 
Western Cape 53 16 3 11 10 93 89% 
Northern Cape 0 25 34 1 7 67 89% 
Gauteng 3 81 13 10 13 120 89% 
North West 0 13 7 33 13 66 80% 
Mpumalanga 6 48 2 9 18 83 78% 
Limpopo 5 31 3 16 24 79 70% 
Free State 0 27 9 5 20 61 67% 
Eastern Cape 0 13 1 6 37 57 35% 
KwaZulu-Natal 2 12 0 0 49 63 22% 
South Africa 69 241 71 117 192 690 72% 
% Total 10% 35% 10% 17% 28% 100% 
* The category ‘Other’ includes a wide variety of nationalities, including spaza shops operated by Mozambicans,
Swazis, Indians, Pakistanis, Nigerians, Ghanaians and Lesotho nationals. A further 28 interviewees across the entire
study were of unknown (but non-South African) nationalities. These were excluded from further analysis.
The data indicates regional trends of settlement: Ethiopians make up the largest spaza trader 
groups identified in peri-urban Northern Cape, Johannesburg, rural Limpopo and Mpumalanga 
sites. Zimbabweans predominate at the North West site, and Somalis in Cape Town. South 
African-owned spaza businesses visited during the course of the research are numerically 
dominant only at the eThekwini and rural Eastern Cape sites (see Map 5). 
Map 5: Spaza shop operations by nationality: urban Cape Town, Western Cape, 2017 
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When comparing the 2017 findings with the Sustainable Livelihood Foundation’s historic spaza 
data, it appears that the proportion of foreign-operated enterprises has grown over time relative 
to South African retailers, in a market that is potentially saturated and declining in overall 
business numbers. Comparative data from 2012 to 2017 for the urban Gauteng site suggests that 
the demographic profile of spaza ownership has substantively changed and the total number of 
spaza shops has fallen from 184 to 120 outlets in the five-year period to 2017 (see Maps 6 and 7). 
Map 6: Spaza shop population, relative distribution and ownership status, urban township, 
Gauteng, 2012 
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4.1.3 South African spaza business decline over time 
Building on the Sustainable Livelihood Foundation’s prior researched township sites, the market 
trends suggest that while spaza business numbers are in collective decline, South African 
microenterprises have proportionally closed down in higher numbers. 
Map 7: Spaza shop population, relative distribution and ownership status, urban township, 
Gauteng, 2017 
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84 83 -1% 25 26 +4% 126 107 -15% 13 14 +7% -7%
South 
African 
37 10 -73% 17 11 -35% 58 13 -78% 86 49 -43% -58%
Total 121 93 -23% 42 37 -12% 184 120 -35% 99 63 -36%
-30%
Box 2: Stories of migration 
Many of the migrant spaza operators interviewed reported having sought employment and 
business opportunities in South Africa, which they had learnt of in their home countries, generally 
from extended family members already based here. Anecdotal evidence from research 
participants reveals that some of the operators were sponsored, while others self-financed their 
journey and establishment in South Africa. Many made considerable sacrifices for the opportunity. 
The researchers heard stories of families selling land, of a shop assistant that had stolen his 
father’s cow to pay for the trip, and others who hiked on foot illegally from Ethiopia to South 
Africa. They also heard accounts of imprisonment in detention camps and bribery of government 
officials. Virtually all these respondents were employee spaza shop assistants, with the majority 
indicating an ambition to return to their home countries in the future. Here are some of the 
stories. 
The journey to South Africa 
“I have been in South Africa since the end of 2008 … but I left Somalia in 2006 … to try and 
establish business in Kenya … I stayed there for one month and left a lot of the money I had 
saved in a bank account with a relative living there ... about $20 000 in total, then I took a boat 
to Tanzania … I was arrested there and captured for one year as I had no documentation and 
did not have enough money to pay the officials off. I was eventually released in 2007 and then 
I went to Malawi as this was the preferred route into South Africa before 2010. I stayed in 
Malawi for about eight months, from there I went to Zimbabwe and then straight into South 
Africa … I did not leave Somalia with the intention of coming to stay in SA, I was merely 
travelling to various countries for places to work or set up business. It was difficult to set up 
proper businesses in these other countries because the police ask for work permits for 
WORKING PAPER #59 ǀ 36 
everything … I was told things were easier in SA and so I came here. When I left Somalia in 
2006 the $20 000 saved up, this was about R204 000 that time, but I spent about $5 000 of 
this while trying to find a place to set up business before coming to South Africa in 2009 ... I 
also spent another $3 000 on my journey to get to South Africa but did not have to wait too 
long as I had enough cash to get into the country without any problems ... when I came to 
South Africa I had access to about R140 000 in my Kenyan bank account ... my relative was 
able to assist me when I needed cash to be sent via money order, bank draft or relatives coming 
to this country.” 
Why South Africa? 
“Jobs back home [in Bangladesh] were very hard to come by as there is much competition for 
limited jobs which don’t pay well, but the main reason why I left nine years ago was due to 
political reasons. At the time I did not support the government … I supported the opposition and 
so it was difficult to get a job in government which is one of a few well-paid vocations in 
Bangladesh. It was difficult to get a work visa in places like the USA and in England so South 
Africa was my next option, it was quicker and easier to get a more permanent work visa in South 
Africa compared to these countries. I was surprised to see that unemployment was so high in 
South Africa and realised that if locals were struggling to find work that it would be even worse 
for immigrants. So, I decided to start a spaza business but I had to first raise money to do this 
... I contacted my father back [home] for assistance to set up a business ... the person [who] 
assisted me through all of this was a lifelong friend who eventually became a business partner 
of mine, he was the first person I contacted in South Africa. When I first came into South Africa 
we did not experience all the problems foreigners now have to deal with when they want to 
come and work or live here on a more permanent basis ... now there is so much paperwork and 
standing in huge lines at places like Home Affairs and so on. Unlike many other foreign 
nationals, I came into the country legally, on a plane straight to Johannesburg ... but I know of 
some of my own people who, like the Somalis and Ethiopians ... travelled through countries like 
Mozambique and Tanzania as they could not get work visas so easily or did not have money ... 
When I first came to South Africa the visa policy, though not as strict as the United States or the 
United Kingdom, was a lot more relaxed than what it is now.” 
4.1.4 Various retail factors 
Some important new differences were identified between South African and foreign-national 
grocery retail outlets. These factors had not been discussed in previous analyses. They include 
employment practices, operating hours, price competitiveness and premises rentals, and help to 
explain important business dynamics in the sector. 
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Employee vs owner operations 
Over the course of the field research, the researchers learned that 45% (221/491 interviewed) of 
foreign spaza traders self-reported as employees rather than as owners, with the ‘boss’ or 
employer being absent. Conversely, over 80% of South African spaza operators in the sample were 
the business owners. A total of 76% of foreign-operated spaza shops (374/491 outlets) and 46% 
(96/194) of South African spaza outlets were providers of paid employment. The 122 South 
African-owned spaza outlets that employed one person or more claimed to employ 153 South 
Africans (a ratio of 1.25 South African employees per outlet). This was in marked contrast to 496 
foreign outlets with one employee or more, who collectively employed 68 South Africans (0.13 
South African employees per outlet). This confirms Ibrahim’s research (2016), where Somali spaza 
businesses highlighted that employing fellow compatriots was considered an important success 
factor in business. 
Table 5: Spaza outlets that employ one person or more, by nationality, and the number of 
South African jobs they create 
Nationality of spaza owner 
Number of outlets with one 
employee or more 
Number of South 
Africans employed 
South African employee 
ratio per outlet 
Bangladeshi 102 7 0.07 
Ethiopian 280 34 0.12 
Somali 90 7 0.08 
Other 24 20 0.83 
Subtotal 496 68 0.13 
South African 122 153 1.25 
Operational hours 
As a business of convenience, there is a reasonable expectation that spaza shops would be open 
for long hours. On average, foreign spaza outlets reported considerably longer operating hours 
than South African outlets in general and South African owner-operators in particular. Table 6 
shows 54% of foreign national outlets operating over 15.5 hours/day, whereas over two-thirds of 
South African outlets operate 14.5 hours or less. 
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Table 6: Aggregated findings of operating hours in spaza shops (South African and non-
South African outlets) 
Operating hours ≥17 h/day ≤16.5 h/day ≤15.5 h/day ≤14.5 h/day ≤13 h/day 
South Africans 3 (2%) 10 (7%) 32 (23%) 31 (22%) 62 (45%) 
Non-South Africans 14 (3%) 79 (19%) 135 (32%) 84 (20%)  104 (25%) 
Price competition 
In terms of product pricing, foreign-national outlets are (marginally) cheaper than South African 
businesses on the majority of baseline groceries. While South Africans retailed the cheapest milk 
and sugar and are largely on parity for bread, eggs were an additional R1 per half dozen, and cold 
drinks, cooking oil and rice were R0.50 more expensive. While this is generally only up to a 5% 
cost difference on various products, it may affect consumer behaviour in price-conscious markets 
(see Table 7). Generally speaking, South African outlets showed reasonable cost competitiveness 
in the grocery trade. 
Table 7: Aggregated survey data of products purchased in South African and non-South 
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Income and rent 
Income data in the spaza sector is scarce and unreliable. Self-reported revenues are commonly 
underestimates (to hide business profitability from nosey outsiders) or employee guesswork made 
without complete knowledge of the business. Nevertheless, just over two-thirds of South African 
spaza outlets reported earning less than R5 000 per month, suggesting that they were operating 
survivalist businesses. Foreign-national traders regularly reported higher shop takings than South 
Africans, with 32% reporting profits upwards of R10 000 per month. These are most likely 
considerable underestimates, given that Liedeman (2013) highlighted that profits of R20 000 per 
month can be attained.  
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Table 8: Aggregated survey data of profits for South African and foreign-national spaza 
shops (South African N = 102 / foreign national N = 189) 
Reported profits R0–R5 000 R5 000–R10 000 R10 000–R15 000 R15 000–R20 000 R20 000+ 
Number of South 
African spaza outlets 
68 (68%) 21 (21%) 6 (6%) 3 (5%) 4 (4%) 
Number of foreign-
national spaza outlets 
69 (37%) 59 (31%) 32 (17%) 19 (10%) 10 (5%) 
According to Plastow (2015), many of the South Africans who have left the spaza sector in the face 
of competition have instead become landlords to this new generation of spaza traders. With 
historical access to land, this has been an important gain for local residents. In this study, 387/469 
(82.5%) of foreign-national spaza shops rented their venues, with 63% of these from a South 
African. In the Johannesburg township, some landlords claimed to be earning at least double the 
rent from letting to foreign-national spaza operators compared to letting for purely residential 
purposes. Subsequently we learned that the majority of foreign-national spaza operators pay shop 
rentals of R750–R800 per month with some landlords receiving up to R3000. 
General dynamics 
As in most enterprises, competitiveness in the informal retail grocery sector is based on 
accumulating incremental profits and savings. There is no universally applicable business model 
that guarantees success and a variety of strategies is used to generate profit. Success requires 
competitive outlooks, entrepreneurial flair and acceptance of risk. Based on our visual impression 
of shops, stock and operations, survivalist spaza outlets are in a weak competitive position. 
Survivalists stock a smaller number of products, a narrower range of items and are open for 
shorter hours than their larger counterparts.  
The time-series data reveals that most South African businesses have closed down in the face of 
competition, with others scaling down, either being relegated to the ‘house shop’ category, or 
leaving the sector altogether. Many have become landlords to this new generation of shops, while 
some South Africans (9%) have responded to competition by diversifying into illegal liquor 
retailing and fast-food take-aways. Some of this diversification may provide clues as to how 
‘embracing informality’ has become key to retaining a foothold in spaza markets. 
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Box 3: A snapshot of survivalist and entrepreneurial spaza shops 
Survivalist shops have a limited variety of goods to sell, small quantities of stock and few items on display, 
retailing at marginally higher prices than their competitors. 
Entrepreneurial shops were well-lit, large spaces with a wide range of stock and product variety, providing 
customers with the opportunity to select the brand and quantity of their choice at marginally lower prices 
than survivalist shops. 
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4.2 A spectrum from survivalists to informalist 
entrepreneurs 
So far, the findings of this study broadly agree with existing literature. The decline in South 
African-owned and -operated spaza outlets reflects the consequences of South Africans being 
largely uncompetitive in business practices when compared to a new generation of township 
grocery retailers. This confirms the argument of Charman et al (2012) that there has been a 
transition towards more entrepreneurially oriented businesses. In this study, the researchers 
identified a spectrum of business operations along a continuum ranging from ‘survivalists’ to 
‘informalists’. Generally speaking, the survivalists represent the declining ‘traditional’ industry of 
spaza shops: micro-informal businesses operated by a family from their home, with a short supply 
chain and associations with other activities including informal food service and, occasionally, 
(illegal) alcohol retail.  
Conversely, the informalists include businesses that have come to dominate the township grocery 
retailing scene. This was achieved through various entrepreneurial attributes previously 
described, and including business investment, group purchasing and longer operating hours. The 
informalists have also embraced business practices to exploit opportunities arising from outside 
the regulatory framework. The demographic changes in the township spaza market have 
coincided with the rise of informalist businesses – with both foreign nationals and South Africans 
operating businesses in each category. It became apparent that spaza entrepreneurs who have 
embraced informality and regulatory avoidance as business practices have been successful in 
gaining economic advantage. In line with the speculation of Liedeman (2013) and Malan (2017), 
the changing demographic profile of informal retail grocery markets has come about as a 
consequence of an emerging class of spaza entrepreneur able to leverage competitive advantage 
through a range of informal, semi-legal or illegal business strategies. Examples of some of these 
strategies are summarised in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Researchers’ systematic observations of legal/extra-legal/illegal business tactics 
used by survivalist and informalist outlets for competitive gain in the spaza sector 
 Survivalist     Informalist   




• Extended trading hours
• Product packages





• Links into wholesalers
• Employment of family
members in-kind
• Circumventing regulatory





• Sale of contraband and illicit goods,
including alcohol
• Credit
• Circumventing regulatory pressure with
respect to business licensing, land-use
management and product controls
• Joint residence/business location
• Illegal labour practices
• Business fronting
The changing nature of the spaza sector reflects new dynamics of business competitiveness that are 
increasingly characterised by the deliberate evasion of regulations by business owners. Regardless of 
the nationality of the operator, the rise of informalists in the retail grocery sector represents a new 
regulatory challenge for South Africa with significant economic, social and legal implications.  
Consolidating the prior findings and the information in the table above, informalists maintain 
competitive advantage using the following means:  
• supply-chain integration and multiple retail-outlet ownership;
• employment strategies (including labour exploitation); and
• supply and retail of contraband and counterfeit goods.
The last two decades have seen the emergence of corporate shopping malls and supermarkets in the 
township economy, which has further affected grocery-retailing dynamics. 
4.2.1 Supply-chain links and multiple retail-outlet ownership 
With at least 45% of spaza respondents being foreign-national employees working for a ‘boss’ who 
is located elsewhere, we noted a common trend (for all sites and across various nationalities) of 
supply-chain integration between spaza shops and independent upstream wholesale enterprises. 
These wholesalers commonly operate from high street and central business district (CBD) retail 
spaces vacated by corporate retailers who have relocated to shopping malls. We visited these outlets 
to observe the business linkages first-hand. All were large (commonly 100 m2 or more), logistically 
sophisticated outlets with a broad range of grocery items traded to downstream spaza shops. These 
supply chains were tightly governed and strongly socially networked, based on ethnic and national 
ties.  
spectrum 
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Supply agreements between spaza shops and these wholesale outlets allow for enhanced economies 
of scale in stock procurement and aggregation of orders. The respective outlets are linked by 
distribution vehicles (generally a small ‘bakkie’ driven by a trusted person from within the business 
network) that deliver grocery supplies to spaza shops and (according to shop assistants) collect 
accumulated cash takings for return to the wholesaler. Links into this socially networked supply-
chain system bring about efficiencies in stock procurement for members. In addition, these links 
appeared to reduce the need for formal banking services by keeping both financial and stock 
management in-house, relying on trust and informality to ensure competitiveness. 
Business ownership of many spaza outlets in the sector remains opaque. Altogether 291/496 (59%) 
of foreign-operated outlets in the study reported ownership by multiple partners rather than 
individuals. Where retail employees in shops (N=285) provided their boss’s phone number, there 
were nine cases of two or more shops in an area reporting to the same superior (Ethiopians = 5; 
Zimbabweans = 2; Somalis = 1). In the follow-up Ethiopian spaza survey in Cape Town, respondents 
in 17 spaza outlets reported that they directly knew of at least 45 spaza shops within surrounding 
township areas that were owned by their collective ‘bosses’. At the time of the interview, the same 
sample reported that 8/17 shop owners were in Bellville, two were ‘in town’, and three were in other 
spaza shops.  
While it was impractical in this study to fully quantify how these complex models of supply, 
partnership and ownership work, the implications of wholesaler and distribution practice seem to be 
that many township-based foreign-national spaza shops should not be seen as stand-alone businesses 
but rather as downstream and linked retail ‘outlets’ of larger, vertically integrated grocery business 
entities. Understanding their stock and financial retail arrangements is an important area for future 
research. 
Box 4: Bangladeshi wholesaler, rural Eastern Cape 
The research site has a bustling but structurally run-down main street with multiple wholesalers, mostly run by a 
number of foreign nationals. We encountered a young Bangladeshi wholesaler who has been in the area for five 
years. Two of his brothers followed him to South Africa within a few years and his youngest brother arrived a few 
months ago. He has not seen his parents or wife since he left Bangladesh. He will not bring his wife out to South 
Africa as he says it is not safe at all. He also wants to go home in the near future as his parents are getting old and 
need looking after. His brothers will stay behind to run the shop. They chose to come to South Africa as there was 
opportunity to run a business and make money but he says it is not a friendly place to live.  
His residential neighbours, a Chinese family, suffered an armed robbery and were all shot and killed. His shop 
closes at 15h00 every day because of the crime. Every wholesaler employs armed security to stay in the shop at 
night because after 16h00 the area becomes very unsafe and many wholesalers have been broken into by armed 
robbers and stock was stolen. He has had two security guards shot and killed while they were in his service.  
He sells a diverse range of products from food, house appliances and basic clothes to cosmetics, as well as cigarettes 
in a caged corner-section in the shop next door to his business. The researchers purchased two boxes of differently 
branded cigarettes (20s) sold in his shop at R6 per box of 20s.  
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4.2.2 Employment 
In the context of self-employment (commonly the South African situation) poor working conditions 
(such as low wages) may be accepted as part of the process of growing the business to commercial 
scale. However, when these conditions are endured by shop employees with no business ownership 
share, labour exploitation can be a concern. The working conditions for employees, regardless of 
nationality, in informal businesses such as spaza shops are unlikely to meet the criteria for ‘decent 
work’.7 Poor wages, long hours and difficult working conditions are the norm, and a significant 
element of exploitation is evident in spaza employment. Conditions for employees vary from shop to 
shop but are generally extremely poor. For example, 260/363 employee respondents (72%) claimed 
to sleep at the shop property, with 123 (34%) of these sleeping in the premises. At least 126 reported 
being the only employee in a retail outlet which they stated to be open for at least 12 hours/day and 
seven days/week; 80 of these individuals reported working 15 hours/day or more. 
Foreign nationals employed as shop assistants seemed particularly vulnerable to exploitation. 
Ethiopian shop assistants in eThekwini reported that they earned R400–R800 per month plus food. 
In Cape Town, reported earnings were higher, with Ethiopian shop assistants reporting earnings of 
R1 500–R3 000 per month, and one individual earning up to R4 000 (‘in a good month’). Three of 
the 17 reported working towards shareholding in the outlet and saw themselves as ‘partners’ (their 
payment terms were not further explored). Thirteen of the remaining Ethiopians considered 
themselves employees only, with no written employment contract. Fourteen of the 15 who responded 
to the question claimed not to have a South African bank account. Eight of the 17 Ethiopian employees 
reported that some or all of their wages were retained by the employer, with some apportioned to 
the employee and the balance paid directly to the employee’s family in their home country. Nine of 
the 17 respondents in this group reported paying back their travel expenses to South Africa through 
employer deductions from their earnings – mostly over a two- to three-year period. These working 
conditions violate the sectoral determination of South Africa’s Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(BCEA), which stipulates that the minimum an employee in the sector (in 2017) can earn is R3 701.82 
(in Area ‘A’, which equates to four research sites) and R3 207.97 per month (in Area ‘B’ – the 
remaining areas),8 for a 45-hour work week. Furthermore, employees must be given 12 hours rest in 
each 24-hour period; and 36 consecutive rest hours per week (which must include Sunday, unless 
otherwise agreed in writing). Despite the small scale of the Cape Town revisit, it suggested a practice 




WORKING PAPER #59 ǀ 45 
Box 5: Financial informality 
An important gap in the study was how informalist spaza businesses dealt with cash. Various discussions with 
shop assistants revealed that few of these businesses had South African bank accounts and all relied on 
alternative financial systems. The researchers were unable to gain a coherent understanding of how these 
financial systems operated but did gather some anecdotal stories. 
According to interview respondents, remittances are typically transferred in cash through various social 
networks and also via the broker system responsible for transporting employees into South Africa. Money was 
also sent in various other ways: via bank draft, money order and other for example Somali money systems 
such as the Xawilaad or Taar (Lindley, 2008). In most cases, spaza investors use remittances to add capital to 
the savings accumulated while working in South Africa or the investments secured from relatives, friends or 
other businessmen who already owned successful spaza shops. They noted this financial assistance as ‘crucial’ 
to their ability to grow their spaza businesses quickly and in such competitive conditions. Somali respondents 
noted the primary means of raising capital for their businesses came in the form of either a loan (from relatives 
or friends) or from the profits they had acquired through the sale of previous spaza businesses. One operator 
explained: ‘… after being in Cape Town for a few months, my sister sent me some dollars through some 
Swedish people who own a business here in South Africa ... from this I got capital for my first business with 
two other Somali relatives [distant cousins from the same Abgal subclan]’. Some of these matters are discussed 
in Ibrahim (2016) and Liedeman (2013). 
In addition, respondents reported (in eThekwini, Cape Town and the rural Eastern Cape) that their 
passports were held by their employers (although they retained their asylum permits). This assertion 
was demonstrated in the Cape Town resurvey for 12 of the 13 Ethiopian spaza employees interviewed. 
The researchers were unable to fully assess the relationship between shop assistants and their 
employers – especially where the shop assistant could be deferring compensation to work towards 
an ‘investment’ in a shop, paying back their passage to South Africa (reported by 11/17 Ethiopians in 
the follow-up study), having a part or all of their wages sent to Ethiopia to family (8/17 respondents), 
or simply being a wage worker. Employment conditions are likely to be influenced by their family 
relationship to the business network, the entrepreneurial orientation of the individuals concerned 
and the relative economic position of the shop assistant. In the case of Ethiopians, these relationships 
are overseen using the Oromo people’s Gadaa life and justice system, which was considered by 
various respondents to override South African law. In this system, contracts are verbal but include 
an outside witness to agreements. Such undocumented employment arrangements are also 
reportedly common for Somali nationals – see Liedeman (2013).  
It is important to note that employment arrangements are not necessarily always exploitative. In the 
informal retail grocery sector, a range of employment and ownership/business arrangements are in 
place, which vary from site to site and culture to culture. For example, Bangladeshi wholesalers 
interviewed in the rural Eastern Cape reported starting salaries for new spaza operators at R5 500 
per month, with some earning R7 500. In some cases, individuals in spaza shops were able to save 
money and attain partner status to become business shareholders, or planned to start new 
enterprises in their own right. While bound by informal employment terms, various individuals 
reported that they preferred the opportunities presented by working in South Africa to conditions 
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they faced at home. It is apparent that the informalist business model capitalises on the availability 
of such migrant labour.  
  
Box 6: What is labour exploitation? 
According to the United Kingdom Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority (GLAA, undated) there are 
a number of signs indicating the presence of human trafficking and labour exploitation within the ambit 
of what is termed ‘modern slavery’. Not all of these signs need to be present, but where some are apparent, 
‘cases of forced labour and victims of modern slavery are likely to exist’. The GLAA have highlighted a 
number of indicators, including the following:  
● The employees’ passport is held by somebody else.
● Employees are unable to leave the work environment and find themselves in a situation of
dependence.
● Employees are scared of revealing their immigration status.
● Employees have no work contract and receive little or no payment.
● The perception that workers are bonded by debt and that transport to the destination country
was paid by a facilitator who they must then pay back by working for them.
● Employees are unable to choose where or when they work, they are forced to work under
certain conditions such as excessively long hours over long periods with no time off.
● Employees have no choice where they live and are living in degrading, unsuitable places.
Working under conditions such as these does not equate to giving ‘consent’.
Quantifying the scale of this dynamic in South Africa for foreign-national migrant employees is 
challenging given the terms of informality in the township economy. However, as derived from the main 
national dataset and the smaller Cape Town subset, the following features should give cause for concern: 
● 22% of respondents reported working 15 hours per day or more (n=126; also see Liedeman,
2013);
● 34% of respondents reported sleeping in the shop premises (n=123; also see Liedeman, 2013);
● 12/13 employees’ passports were being withheld (Cape Town subset; also see Liedeman, 2013);
● 13/14 employees had no written contract (Cape Town subset; also see Liedeman, 2013);
● 11/18 individuals were paying back debts to their employers for their passage to South Africa
(Cape Town subset).
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 Box 7: Excerpts of interview transcript with Ethiopian spaza employee at ‘Robot Shop’, eThekwini 
site, 24 May 2017 – Researcher and Interpreter  
Where is your passport? 
‘The boss keeps his passport so that he does not run away.’  
‘This is kept for security as the employee sits in the shop with lots of cash.’ 
How many bosses are there? 
‘There are so many. Some come to deliver, but he does not know if they are bosses or not.’ 
‘Some bosses come to collect R800–R1 000 every day from the shop.’ 
When do you get paid? 
‘The boss sends some of the money home and otherwise keeps the money for him. He can get the money 
from the boss when he needs it. If the boss finds money in his pocket he will be suspicious. Therefore he gets 
his money after he leaves when the boss pays him out. He is saving money via the boss who holds it for him.’ 
Do you plan to open your own shop? 
‘He has been in South Africa for two years. He worked in Umlazi for a different boss, then came here. He 
earns R300 per month plus R300 to Ethiopia, which is sent home. The boss supplies him with food and he 
lives in this container. He can eat anything from the container. If he needs time he asks the boss for time off. 
When the R300 is taken to Ethiopia, it is a lot of money.’  
Do you own any portion or shareholding of this shop or are you just working for the boss? 
‘He is just an employee and he can change shops. He is just working.’  
Why did you have a conflict with the previous boss? Why did you leave? 
‘He was paid R200 + R200. He came here for R200 (R100 + R100) more.’ 
‘There is another boss who can offer him R400 + R400. When he wants to leave he must tell his boss, who 
must return his passport and his saved money.’  
Can you trust that the boss will give back the passport and the money? 
‘The boss always tells the truth. He trusts the boss. There is a written contract for three months. He gets his 
money when his contract is over. The money is only sent home and paid after the conclusion of the contract.’ 
How many Robot Shops are there? 
‘He does not know how many Robot Shops there are but there are so many …’ 
‘He would want to go back to Ethiopia and pursue an education. He is raising money to pursue his 
education.’  
‘The container is not safe and it is hot. He would love to move if given the opportunity at any time. He would 
like to get a job with [a] wholesaler in Phoenix who does a special deal for Ethiopian shops. He hopes to get a 
job there in time.’ 
‘He has a friend on the outside who connects him with the outside world. He gives him a little money and the 
guy is an agent. While he is here in the container someone is out there networking for him – you have to get 
connections outside. When you are working in a shop that is air conditioned you are a free man.’ 
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4.2.3 Contraband and counterfeit goods 
Contraband cigarettes
Retailing contraband cigarettes (either grey-market products or illegal imports) is another 
important aspect of informalist competitiveness. Spaza shops sell cigarettes on a ‘loose-draw’ 
basis, with individual cigarettes (depending on the brand) selling for between R0.50 and R3.00 
per stick. Pricing is determined by brand and segmented into ‘economy’ and ‘premium’ products. 
Economy tobacco includes ostensibly legitimate brands where the requisite duties are not paid, or 
illegal imports. According to the National Treasury, in 2017 the tax on a box of 20 cigarettes was 
R14.30 plus 14% VAT (totalling R16.45 per pack, or 85c per stick). Cigarettes retailed loose and 
sold at below 85c per stick are thus certainly contraband. Similarly, those retailing at R1.00 per 
stick are most likely contraband, as only 15c per stick (a 15% margin) remains for the additional 
direct costs of growing, manufacturing, marketing, wholesaling, distribution and retail pricing. 
Note that while cheap pricing is an obvious measure of illegality, it is only one indicator of likely 
contraband status (others include untaxed full-price cigarettes and counterfeit products, neither 
of which we could assess). This, and underreporting by respondents, make estimates in this study 
conservative.  
Of the 577 retail spaza outlets where loose-draw cigarettes were purchased, there was abundant 
evidence of contraband. While all sites, and all nationalities, are involved in the trade, South 
African shopkeepers had the least access (36% trading in contraband), and Somalis and 
Bangladeshis the most (respectively 77% and 67% of retailers) (see Table 10). 
Table 10: Evidence of under-priced cigarettes (actual purchases from spaza shops at R1.00 
or less), by nationality* 
Province Somali Ethiopian Bangladeshi 
South 
African 
Other Total* % in sites 
Western Cape 47 / 53 14 / 16 3 / 3 6 / 10 8 / 11 78 / 93 84% 
Northern Cape 0 18 / 25 24 / 34 3 / 7 0 / 1 45 / 67 67% 
Gauteng 0 / 3 41 / 81 6 / 13 3 / 13 5 / 10 55 / 120 46% 
North West 0 9 / 12 5 / 7 4 / 14 20 / 33 38 / 66 58% 
Mpumalanga 3 / 6 23 / 49 0 / 2 6 / 18 4 / 8 36 / 83 43% 
Limpopo 2 / 5 12 / 31 1 / 3 0 / 24 4 / 16 19 / 79 24% 
Free State 0 4 / 9 21 / 27 12 / 20 3 / 5 40 / 61 66% 
Eastern Cape 0 4 / 13 0 / 1 10 / 38 1 / 6 15 / 58 26% 
KwaZulu-Natal 1 / 2 8 / 12 0 25 / 49 0 34 / 63 54% 
South Africa 53 / 69 133 / 248 60 / 90 69 / 193 45 / 90 360 / 690 52% 
% by nationality 77% 54% 67% 36% 50% 52% 
*This will be an underestimate, as some refused to serve the researchers.
**27% of all cigarettes retailed (legal and illegal) were below 84c per stick (contraband) while 25% were sold at
85c–R1.00 (likely contraband) – based on metrics from the University of Cape Town Economics of Tobacco Control
Project. Note that cigarettes sold above R1.00 in the township market have no guarantee of legitimacy.
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Breaking down the data differently shows the important role of contraband in the informalist 
business model. Taking the 210 outlets with two employees or more, 177 of these volunteered 
cigarette retailing data (including 21 South African shops). Of these, only 39 outlets reported 
selling full-price cigarettes (theoretically including the tax portion), while 138 outlets (78%) also 
sold cigarettes that were probably or certainly contraband.  
Despite the regional variation, the popular ‘economy cigarette’ brands sold in the township are 
made by companies linked to high-profile Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
political families9 and those not averse to using criminal tactics.10 A variety of contraband 
cigarettes originate in South Africa, but Zimbabwe and Mozambique are also important sources 
of supply.  
It was reported by ‘survivalist’ shopkeepers that without established contacts or high levels of 
financial investment, it is difficult to access wholesale contraband cigarettes. Such links require 
strong underground networks that break the law through tax avoidance and fraudulent invoicing. 
The researchers were able to openly buy wholesale cartons of cigarettes for R60 (R6 per box / 30c 
per stick) in Limpopo; a retailed box (20) for R6 from traders in the rural Eastern Cape (30c per 
stick); a carton of cigarettes for R58 (equating to R5.80 per box of 20 cigarettes / 29c per stick) 
from a wholesaler in the Free State; and a carton of cigarettes for R45 (R4.50 per box / 23c per 
stick) from a Cape Town wholesaler. 
9 Jacques Pauw’s 2017 book The President’s Keepers details some of these individuals and their activities – a 
summary can be found here: timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-10-29-gangster-republic-dirty-cigarette-
money-is-funding-ndzs-bid-for-president and here: timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/lifestyle/2013-12-29-mugabe-
link-to-illegal-cigarette-trade.  
10 pressreader.com/south-africa/the-sunday-independent/20160306/281638189296919.  
Plate 2: A range of under-priced cigarette boxes sampled from spaza shops across 
South Africa 
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It is important to note that the spaza shop assistants selling contraband commonly appeared 
unaware of the illegal nature of this trade (aside from Mpumalanga, where there was active 
policing of illegal imports from Mozambique).  
In addition to the complexities of informalist businesses, including close-knit wholesalers and 
deliveries, contraband tobacco forms a critical component of the informal economy of grocery 
retailing – as can be seen in Map 8. 
Counterfeit goods
There are many different kinds of counterfeiting. In this study, counterfeit goods were considered 
to be unauthorised and fake replicas of a genuine product. The implications of the trade in 
counterfeit goods require nuanced assessment. While these products may violate trademarks and 
brand protection, they are in many cases not necessarily unsafe for consumers. Counterfeit goods 
Map 8: Presence or absence of cheap cigarettes in spaza shops by nationality of 
operations, Mpumalanga, 2017 
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therefore represent cost-effective alternatives to items that rely on their branded status for steep 
mark-ups. However, counterfeit foodstuffs or pharmaceutical products of unknown origin and 
composition can pose genuine health concerns, bring legal and integrity risks to the original brand 
owners, and can support national and transnational criminal networks. After ascertaining the 
presence of counterfeits in township markets from media reports11 and a spaza shop owner in 
Johannesburg (who referred to specific items) the researchers conducted physical inspections of 
and purchased selected grocery items from spaza shops and upstream wholesalers. Building on 
the investigation in four provinces (Gauteng, the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern 
Cape) the research sites were revisited and up to 23 predetermined specific items were purchased 
(when available) from each of up to 15 retail outlets per site. Spaza shops were selected 
proportionally in number to overall trader nationalities and business characteristics, alongside 
two to three local supermarkets at each site. All purchases were labelled, aggregated, scrutinised 
and compared to established product baselines. They were also examined for any discrepancies in 
packaging, standards, appearance, smell, taste, ‘feel’ and other factors. 










Urban 15 • Supermarket: 2
• Spaza (South African): 1
• Spaza (Somali, Bangladeshi,
Ethiopian): 14
8–11 November 
Gauteng Urban 15 • Supermarket: 3
• Spaza (South African): 2




Urban 15 • Supermarket: 3
• Spaza (South African): 8




Rural 15 • Supermarket: 3
• Spaza (South African): 2
• Spaza (Ethiopian, Bangladeshi)
Pakistani, Chinese): 10
13–15 October 
The researchers submitted these samples to the brand owners and ‘brand protection’ lawyers, and 
a private fraud specialist for product assessment. The specialist conducted a blind review of 
uniquely coded stock items (unaware of which products were purchased from which outlets or 
localities) and spent numerous days working through the sample collection. The consolidated 
findings for each region are given in Table 12. 
11 heraldlive.co.za/business/2017-04-03-more-fakes-on-the-make. 
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Table 12: Incidence of likely counterfeit goods in relation to research area 
Province Total number of likely counterfeit 
goods identified 
Percentage of likely counterfeit 
goods from sample group 
Gauteng 50 / 116 samples 43.1% 
Western Cape 46 / 157 samples 29.2% 
Eastern Cape 41 / 150 samples 27.3% 
KwaZulu-Natal 20 / 131 samples 15.2% 
Counterfeit goods were found to be relatively commonplace, representing nearly 30% of all 
purchased samples. The shopping list and findings are summarised in Table 13.  
Table 13: Item type, brand and percentage incidence of fraudulence in informal retail 
grocery outlets 
Item type 
Evidence of fraud or illegality 
Yes or No 
Percentage of likely counterfeit items 
in sample group 




Infant nappy No – 
Bread (cheapest) No – 
Rice (cheapest) Yes Indeterminate 
Maize meal Yes 11.5% 
Spice sachet No – 
Stock cubes Yes 5.8% 
Loose sweets No – 
Razor blades Yes 76% 
Sanitary pads Yes 47.2% 
Curry powder No – 
Shoe polish Yes 26.6% 
Cigarette papers Yes 78% 
Cortisone cream Yes 





Deodorant No – 
Instant coffee No –
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* Note: Aside from clear impersonators (pictured below in Plates 3 and 4), brands and manufacturers have been
omitted from this publication.
As with contraband cigarettes, counterfeit goods in spaza shops are commonly sourced from 
upstream wholesalers who in turn access them through their own supply-chain networks. Formal-
sector supermarkets visited by the researchers did not stock obvious counterfeits such as those 
pictured in this report, yet many independent wholesalers did. Similar to the sale of contraband 
cigarettes, many spaza shop assistants appeared to be retailing these goods to consumers without 
being aware of their counterfeit nature.  
While the sample size was small (albeit widespread in four provinces), of the 50 spaza shops from 
which products were purchased, between one and 10 counterfeit items were detected in 45 outlets. 
This suggests the likelihood that counterfeit goods are widespread in township markets (note that 
no ‘fake’ foods were found). Reconsidering the findings in terms of survivalist and informalist 
outlets (as previously discussed) shows a link between the type of business and the availability of 
counterfeit goods.  
Table 14: Survivalist and informalist spaza outlets and retailing of counterfeit grocery 
items 
Nature of spaza shop Percentage of counterfeit items purchased 
Survivalist 10.8% (10 / 93 items) 
Informalist 26.1% (120 / 460 items) 
While some survivalist retailers stocked counterfeit goods, the greater prevalence of this practice 
occurred among informalists. This suggests a stronger degree of connectivity with alternative and 
sometimes criminal12 supply chains. The following plates (3 and 4) show genuine (original brand) 
products and packaging on the left, and examples of commonly purchased counterfeits on the 
right-hand side. The spelling, branding and packaging likely represent trademark infringements 
on the original products. 
12 bowmanslaw.com/insights/corporate-risk/counterfeiting-not-victimous-crime. 
Medicinal tea Yes 87.5% 
Yeast Yes 24.2% 
Toilet paper No – 
Lip balm Yes 58% 
Eggs No –
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Plate 3: Commonly purchased counterfeit example 1: Razor blades 
Plate 4: Commonly purchased counterfeit goods example 2: Matches 
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Box 8: South African spaza owner Steve – a story of survival 
Steve has been running his spaza shop for more than 11 years. He has a large, walk-in shop and employs 
various people in jobs behind the cash register and in stock management and procurement. Steve used to 
be a project manager for Sasol but after many years he decided to set up his own business. Investing private 
savings, he purchased a property in a major Johannesburg township and converted the house garage into 
a spaza shop. Steve has observed the change in spaza ownership demographics over the years and told us 
that he was the last remaining South African-owned outlet in his area, with a number of Ethiopian shops 
having opened up around him [the geospatial data confirms this]. As a consequence, he has included the 
illegal retailing of liquor into his business mix and has expanded his business space to include a pool table 
and 1980s-style arcade games. This, he says, is one of his only competitive strategies as foreigners either 
won’t risk selling alcohol or they cannot as they are of Muslim faith. Steve proudly states that all the 
products he sells are genuine and that most of the surrounding shops sell fake items. He claims to pay more 
for his products and therefore makes less profit, which is why he says the other shops are doing better. 
Steve believes that foreign traders buy exclusively from wholesalers that do not trade with South African 
spaza shop owners.13 
4.2.4 Supermarkets and shopping malls 
South Africa’s corporate supermarket chains have undoubtedly influenced the competitive 
dynamics in informal sector grocery markets. Industry submissions to the Competition 
Commission Retail Grocery Inquiry in 2017 assert that collective supermarket outlet numbers 
have a compound annual growth rate of 4.7%. Over five years, between FY2011 and FY2015, 
Pick n Pay reported a 6%, and Shoprite a 7%, compounded net annual increase in new stores. 
With Pick n Pay claiming to have ‘approximately 1 000 stores’ nationwide, this equates to about 
60 new retail outlets per annum. Similarly, the Shoprite Checkers Group operates about 1 324 
outlets with growth at 7% per year (90+ new stores per annum) (Shoprite Holdings, 2017). For 
Cape Town alone, an illustrative view of just Pick n Pay and Shoprite outlet growth over five 
years using phone directories (2012 and 2017 editions) reveals the newly listed supermarket 
localities given in Table 15. 
The outlets listed in bold are proximal to township consumer markets and would directly 
compete with informal retail grocery outlets. Those in italics, while not located in township 
settings, actively market and serve commuting township consumers. It is likely that this trend is 
considerably more widespread across South Africa.14 
13 Considering the extent of vertical integration between wholesalers and township retail outlets revealed in this 
study, it is likely that trade arrangements could favour those within these networks compared to those outside. 
14 Supermarkets and shopping malls were largely beyond the scope of this study, but are equally worthy of 
deeper investigation for their competitive tactics and market behaviour in the township economy. 
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Table 15: New Pick n Pay and Shoprite supermarkets as listed in the Cape Peninsula 
Telkom White Pages Telephone Directory 2017 (unlisted in 2012) 
Pick n Pay Shoprite 
Adelphi Philippi Du Noon Nonqubela 
Lotus River Atlantis Khayelitsha Site C Pelican Park 
Middestad Mall Big Bay Langa Retreat 
Pinehurst Graanendal Lansdowne Woodstock 
Parklands Khayelitsha Nyanga Junction 
Wynberg Maitland 
The push of malls and supermarkets into the township sector has increased competition in 
informal township grocery markets. This coincided with the emergence of informalist grocery 
practices. When these forces combine, they are likely to squeeze survivalists and stand-alone spaza 
outlets out of the sector.
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5. Conclusion: Survivalists, informalists and
competition in the retail grocery trade
5.1 Survivalists and informalists 
Informality is both a product of South Africa’s history of economic marginalisation of certain 
population groups and a key part of its future trajectory for economic development. Marginalised 
in economic terms, the perceptions and practices of microenterprise owners in South Africa are 
shaped by a ‘culture of informality’ characterised by deeply ambivalent and sometimes suspicious 
perceptions of regulation. The government is often perceived as unduly authoritarian and unfair 
in its treatment of its poorest citizens in informal enterprises, anti-democratic in its framing of 
policies, and unaccountable for the actions of its agents of law enforcement and regulation.  
These perceptions in the public imagination are understandable, given South Africa’s long history 
of arbitrary and repressive state action with respect to informal businesses. Inappropriate laws 
and regulations create enforced informality, where the impossibility of legal compliance (such as 
through inflexible land-use zoning and rigid licensing systems) means that many businesses 
perforce operate in a legal vacuum, unable to benefit from the protection or support of the state 
(Charman et al, 2012). At the same time, many enterprises in the spaza sector have chosen a 
strategy of embracing informality. By deliberately avoiding regulation, these businesses entrench 
labour market segmentation, leave workers unprotected, reduce state taxation revenue, and 
weaken state influence in minimising the negative impacts of dubious business practices (such as 
trading in contraband and counterfeit goods).  
This study demonstrates the interconnections between demographic and competitive change in 
the informal retail grocery sector in South African townships. An important dimension of change 
has been the decline of survivalist spaza shops. Based on our general findings of shops, stock and 
operations, survivalist outlets are unable to compete effectively with their better-resourced 
informalist competitors. Survivalist businesses stock fewer products and a narrower range of 
items, are heavily reliant on family labour, and also trade for shorter hours. They are less able to 
scale up, and the time series data suggests that they are being crowded out of the township 
economy. Some of the South Africans who have closed shop have instead rented their premises to 
informalist retailers, while others have responded by diversifying into activities such as liquor 
retailing. However, entry into the highly policed liquor sector without prospects of obtaining a 
retailer’s licence subsequently exposes those entrepreneurs to police raiding, criminalising many 
in their pursuit of a livelihood (Charman et al, 2013). As spaza shops are not legislated or policed 
in the same way as liquor outlets, the lower risks of punitive action from the state has meant that 
informalist grocery retailers are able to leverage competitive opportunities from illegal business 
practices without fearing state penalties. 
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5.2 Revisiting ‘rights to trade’ and ‘livelihoods’ 
perspectives 
 
South Africa is undergoing a long-running and ongoing process of demographic change. Migration 
into South Africa has brought about important strides in entrepreneurship and social dynamics 
with many societal and economic benefits. It is certainly clear that the arrival of foreign-national 
spaza operators with distinctive traditions of entrepreneurship and commercial practice has 
influenced the workings of township markets. Various authors, such as Gastrow and Amit (2013), 
Tawodzera et al (2015) and Plastow (2015), acknowledge that these changes have also brought 
some detriment to the sector, primarily in the form of South African spaza business closures, but 
they argue that these disadvantages are outweighed by enhanced consumer well-being from 
greater business competition.  
At face value, foreign-national spaza outlets are more diverse in their product range compared to 
South African shops. Furthermore, owing to their higher turnover, these shops are generally well 
stocked as they are linked to reliable distribution networks that serve to keep shelves full with 
grocery items. These spaza shops are well located within the township geography and are open 
for long hours, making them accessible in both space and time. Owing to enhanced 
entrepreneurial and competitive practices (such as integration with wholesalers) these outlets can 
sometimes offer cheaper prices on certain goods than their South African counterparts. In poor 
communities (which predominate in South Africa) reliable access to cheap food must be seen as 
critical in enhancing food security. South Africans have also benefited from opportunities to let 
their premises to these emerging spaza businesses.  
Any business attempting to operate legally from the trenches of the township economy deserves 
state support. Township enterprises in general, and migrant businesses in particular, also have 
the hard-won legal and constitutional right to engage in economic activities anywhere in South 
Africa (including operating spaza shops). In particular, when the enterprises in question are 
survivalist businesses operated by victims of structural economic marginalisation, as is 
commonplace in South Africa’s townships, then at the least these enterprises should be left alone. 
However, the right to trade is not universal and should not include the ability to gain competitive 
advantage through active regulatory avoidance. Where informalist competitive practices 
(regardless of the nationality of the business owner) involve labour and trading practices that 
violate South African law, a laissez faire approach is not appropriate.  
The impact of ignoring active regulatory avoidance by the spaza sector has resulted in the decline 
of survivalist spaza shops and in the loss of an important economic empowerment opportunity – 
particularly for black South African women. While South Africans have benefited from letting 
opportunities to accommodate new foreign-national entrants into the spaza market, this does not 
counter the loss of income from self-employment nor the broader social/community impacts 
where spaza businesses were closed down (see Neves and Du Toit, 2012).  
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The widespread emergence of contraband cigarettes and counterfeit goods is of particular 
concern. While these products may counter the effects of over-priced branded consumer goods, 
they also transfer profits to criminal groups who seek to violate intellectual property and branding 
rights, mislead the consumer, reduce tax contributions to the government, allow poor labour 
practice and possibly bring about unknown health risks for consumers.  
Finally, an important group of direct victims of this rapidly changing dynamic are migrant shop 
assistants themselves, who are exploited in opaque employment agreements with low incomes, 
exceedingly long hours and poor working conditions. Many are unwittingly retailing contraband 
or counterfeit goods on behalf of their ‘bosses’. They reside and operate from isolated township 
outlets, where they are on the receiving end of xenophobia and violent crime from thugs and 
disgruntled community members. Indeed, the Somali Community Board noted 723 recorded 
deaths of Somali spaza operators within five years in South Africa (Mail and Guardian, 2017). It is 
certain that many of these murder victims served as township-based employees in larger 
businesses. 
Informalist spaza outlets capitalise on the tolerance extended to poor and survivalist enterprises 
(including municipal concessions to operate home-based businesses in townships), but also 
potentially bypass other important regulations (labour laws and trading in legal products) in 
pursuit of profits. Conversely, supermarket chains and shopping malls use their power to buy 
township land and influence municipalities to amend land-use zoning and award business rights 
(including trading and liquor licences) to expand their business footprint.  
Survivalist grocery retailers have thus found themselves competitively and geographically 
squeezed between informalists, supermarkets and shopping malls. They are constrained by 
regulatory exclusion and their reliance on competitive approaches based on social capital 
(embodied in kinship, family and social networks) rather than price competition, and have 
collectively lost market share because they are unable to compete in the changing dynamics. 
Informalist operators in particular have ignored the local cultural context in their business 
approach by (for example) using aggressive price discounting and employing few local community 
members (Ibrahim, 2016). At face value, while advocates of competition have encouraged this 
transition in the spaza market, the unintended consequence (in the absence of regulatory 
enforcement) is market concentration, driven by new and deeper terms of informality.  
It is misleading to consider township spaza shop competition simply in terms of ‘locals versus 
foreigners’. Instead, the competitive dynamic is better understood as the replacement of spaza 
survivalists experiencing regulatory exclusion by informalist spaza businesses (including some 
operated by South Africans) who have actively circumvented legislation in order to gain 
competitive advantage. The emerging market conditions now benefit a new cohort of informalist 
spaza ‘bosses’ at varying scales of operation, who have come to dominate the spaza business 
through a capitalist embrace of informality. Despite the exit of survivalists, the scramble for 
customers continues, for the growing presence of supermarkets and malls means that informalists 
will have to continue to cut costs to maintain market share, likely further deepening their 
informality.  
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The embrace of informality is not unprecedented in South Africa, nor is it the exclusive prerogative 
of spaza informalists. A review of the business practices of the minibus-taxi sector (Ntsebeza, 
1995) provides another example of an industry that actively embraces informality to evade 
regulation. In recent decades this sector has become an impenetrable, concentrated and politically 
powerful network. It operates local and regional transport services largely beyond the control of 
state authorities, picking and choosing the elements of formality that suit its operations, and 
generally ignoring those that do not. The small network of taxi bosses that dominate in the sector 
operates a seemingly parallel system to the state in a strictly enforced hierarchy that involves 
extortionate membership fees, informally determined routes and territories, intimidation, threats 
and violence. In the minibus-taxi sector, the taxi drivers serve at the coalface of the business, tend 
to earn the least money and carry the majority of the personal risk. The situation for informalist 
spaza shop employees in the face of embraced informality, crime and an atmosphere of 
xenophobia (which is in part fostered by these changing market conditions) is not dissimilar. 
Learning from the minibus-taxi sector, it is clear that the entrepreneurial embrace of informality 
poses very real development challenges for South African markets.  
 
5.3 What is to be done? 
 
The sheer number and spatial distribution of informalist retailers, the rise of supermarkets and 
malls, and South Africa’s overarching poorly performing macroeconomic environment mean the 
demise of survivalist spaza shops that are unable to compete on informalist and corporate 
terms. Considering that 134 000 ‘traditional trade’ (township grocery) outlets likely exist in South 
Africa, the implications of the industry change revealed by this study are considerable. The demise 
of spaza shops as an emerging township business activity restricts wealth creation and limits 
South African entrepreneurship in communities where it is most needed.  
This outcome reflects a culmination of state failures. The South African government has failed to 
limit informalist regulatory avoidance throughout the value chain, while simultaneously 
succumbing to the corporate power of shopping mall developers and supermarkets. Increasing 
numbers of politicians have chosen to simplify the development challenge, stoking xenophobic 
tensions by scapegoating foreign spaza shop workers and ‘… throwing immigration as red meat 
to their base for their own, narrow and very personal advantage’ (Grootes, 2018). The polarised 
discussion on this subject has stifled genuine debate over the last decade, while deepening 
informalisation and transformation of the sector has continued largely unabated.  
Active state engagement is required, but more with respect to how township grocery retailing is 
presently conducted than who now retails groceries. The rise of informalist behaviour throughout 
supply chains represents a fundamental development challenge. This will not be resolved by 
simply pandering to xenophobic interests and targeting foreign-national spaza shop operators – 
many of whom already work under exploitative conditions. What the simplistic ‘local versus 
foreign’ narrative misses is that many South Africans currently profit from this state of affairs – 
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from the 36% of South African spaza outlets that sell contraband cigarettes (and their respective 
local manufacturers) through to South Africa’s soft-drink and cell phone companies that sponsor 
spaza shop branding, to a new generation of township landlords who rent property to these 
outlets. The situation that has evolved thus presents a complex and nuanced development 
challenge.  
Suggested policy-maker interventions include the following four actions: 
1. State investigation of all stakeholder roles in the spaza sector  
State attention must investigate the apex of grocery markets – working to understand the 
power structures, networks and individuals that have come to dominate in the sector. This 
includes not only owners and employers of informalist spaza shops but also wholesalers, 
manufacturers and importers who capitalise on this regulatory avoidance and have 
variously supported the evolution of the market conditions to their present state. The 
investigation should also cover patron–client networks that have developed around 
interests in the spaza sector within and around the state. Specific and deeper investigation 
into informalist business tactics including labour relations, financial modalities (cash 
management and cash transfer processes) and national- and international-scale grey and 
black markets is urgently required. At a strategic level, the South African government must 
reconfirm its international commitments to deal with matters of labour exploitation.  
 
2. Regulatory approach for fair competition and business practice 
A regulatory approach for enhancing fair competition and business practice is required. 
The tensions between foreigners and South Africans in the spaza sector should in many 
ways be seen as an indirect result of the ‘race to the bottom’ in part initiated by 
supermarket expansion into the township economy. Policy should address the 
macroeconomic environment underpinning this dynamic with genuine transformation of 
the shopping mall and supermarket environments in ways that support the principles of 
broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE), inclusive growth and emerging 
microenterprises. This includes share-ownership requirements, supplier development and 
the minimum thresholds for retail mall occupancy and supermarket shelf space. It further 
requires reconsideration of current municipal approaches to land-use zoning that 
reinforce ongoing economic inequality in townships. 
  
3. Normalising and formalising the spaza sector  
Furthermore, a process to ‘normalise’ the informal retail grocery sector must bring it 
towards a path of formalisation. There are existing state tools and mechanisms to rein in 
the socially and economically undesirable consequences of this unrestrained capitalism 
and the embracing of informality. A carefully considered approach towards an appropriate 
regulatory environment occurs in ways that do not drive informal-economy grocery 
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businesses into deeper states of informality or out of business altogether. Such an 
approach requires the following framework: 
• Acknowledging survivalist microenterprises as a safety-net 
Genuine survivalist microenterprises do not threaten the state and represent a business 
opportunity for economically marginalised survivalists. With a careful balancing of 
objectives, the regulatory environment must be revised to end the involuntary regulatory 
exclusion of survivalist businesses.  
 
• Nurturing microenterprises towards formalisation 
Ensuring basic standards including the payment of sectorally determined wages, trading 
in legal and taxed products and utilising FICA-compliant monetary systems should be the 
minimum business benchmarks in the spaza sector. Like liquor outlets, all cigarette 
retailers should be individually licensed by the state, with supply chains strictly monitored. 
While there are clear capacity challenges for the state to ensure the above compliance, the 
financial opportunity to recoup lost tax revenue from the illicit cigarette trade alone 
potentially represents multiple billions of rands to the fiscus annually.  
4. Effective engagement of the informal economy 
Finally, and critically, the South African government must more effectively engage the 
informal economy (which collectively employs more people than any individual sector) 
and embrace the opportunity it represents. With township settlements being the epicentre 
of population growth, it is critical that these local economies are stimulated in ways that 
benefit all entrepreneurs, employees and consumers – whether they are South African 
citizens or not. 
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